

JOHN T. MCGREEVY · CATHOLICISM

Chapter 14: Charisma

John Paul II and the End of the Cold War

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[p. 352]

I

HIS LIFE POSSESSED A cinematic grandeur. Born in 1920 in a village twenty miles southwest of Kraków, Karol Wojtyła witnessed some of the most harrowing moments of Poland's harrowing twentieth century. Karol was a bright, athletic student, admired across the town's religious divides. He played on the Jewish side in soccer games between the town's Catholic and Jewish boys. His older sister died before Wojtyła's birth; his mother when Wojtyła was nine. An older brother died when Wojtyła was twelve. Beginning his university studies in Kraków in 1938, Wojtyła put most of his energy into college theatrical productions. After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, he and his father fled east until they realized that Stalin had arranged with Hitler for Soviet armies to occupy the eastern half of the country. They returned to Kraków, where the Germans closed Wojtyła's university. His father died, leaving him bereft of any family. He spent the first years of World War II laboring in a quarry, rubbing petroleum jelly on his face to protect himself against bitterly cold winds on the thirty-minute walk to work. In off hours, he attended a clandestine seminary, once evading a dragnet while hiding in a basement closet as Gestapo officers searched the upper floors. After the war, sent to Rome to study by his archbishop, [p. 353] he wrote a hurried dissertation on the sixteenth-century Spanish mystic John of the Cross.

Returning to Poland, he translated into Polish a major text of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler, influential for Jacques Maritain and many other Catholic intellectuals. He criticized Scheler for veering toward relativism and avoiding the "normative ought." But he admired Scheler's focus on concrete human experience and blended it with the neo-Thomism he had absorbed in Rome and Kraków.¹ As a parish priest and university professor, he was an immediate success. He often took the night train from Kraków to Lublin, arriving in time to teach classes at the Catholic University. He counseled college students and young professionals not only after class, but also on hiking trips and retreats, saying Mass outdoors in violation of government protocols.

Appointed a bishop at the age of thirty-eight, he played a significant role at the Second Vatican Council through participation in the debates over the draft texts for the Declaration on Religious Freedom and *Gaudium et Spes*. His charisma was compelling. As Yves Congar recorded, Wojtyła “made a very great impression. His personality is imposing. A power radiates from it, an attraction, a certain prophetic force that is very calm, but incontestable.”² Henri de Lubac thought Wojtyła possessed “a profound Christian sense, without being at all rigid.”³

Wearing sunglasses and his episcopal robes, Wojtyła could evoke a clerical James Bond. After the council, despite visa hassles with wary Polish state officials, he deepened his ties to church figures across the world through trips to the United States (twice), Canada, the Philippines, and Australia. These visits confirmed his assessment of a “false irenicism, humanism and even secularism” infecting Western European and North American Catholic intellectuals.⁴ At the invitation of Paul VI, he offered a Lenten retreat for the pope and the curia. With Paul VI taking copious notes, he analyzed “dechristianization.” It occurred “by force” in Eastern Europe; by osmosis in the West.⁵

Wojtyła made his version of personalism especially visible through two post-conciliar issues. The first was contraception. Like personalists everywhere, he saw marriage as about more than procreation, as a “genuine union of persons.” But while many personalists moved from [p. 354] this definition of marriage to support for married couples using contraception, Wojtyła did not. Working with Wanda Póltawska, a physician who had survived four years in the Ravensbrück concentration camp, Wojtyła came to see contraception as itself a violation of the human person. His 1960 *Love and Responsibility* defined sexual intercourse as possessing “full value” only “when it contains the conscious acceptance of the possibility of parenthood.”⁶

Placed on the expanded papal birth control commission by Paul VI, Wojtyła did not play an active role, but he did cast one of the few votes against an alteration to church teaching and personally conveyed his views to Paul VI in the run-up to *Humanae Vitae*. After the encyclical’s release, he welcomed its conclusions but wished it had been made “more easily accessible to the modern world.”⁷ In the early 1970s, he established dozens of family counseling and marriage preparation centers in the Kraków archdiocese, hoping to create a “Polish model of pastoral care for families.” (He also pressured Polish writers who endorsed contraceptives to alter their views.)⁸

The second area of Wojtyła’s personalist influence was human rights. If in the 1950s Wojtyła shared conventional Catholic anxieties about the alienation produced by capitalism, in the late 1960s he stressed threats to the human person. As he confided to Henri de Lubac, “the evil of our times consists in the first place of a kind of degradation indeed in a pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person.”⁹

Wojtyła’s *The Acting Person*, published in Polish in 1969, is a dense, almost impenetrable text. (Kraków priests joked that it would be assigned in purgatory.) But its focus on solidarity and the common good as existing beyond particular communities fed into claims

for human rights.¹⁰ Adam Michnik, the secular Polish intellectual most dedicated to establishing common ground with the church, recalled Wojtyła as someone “who used our language and talked clearly about human rights ... we knew we could count on his sympathy.”¹¹ After government officials prohibited a student group in Kraków from organizing a lecture on “Orwell’s 1984 and Poland Today,” Wojtyła arranged for the lecture to be hosted in a local parish.¹²

[p. 355] **II**

JOHN PAUL II’S ENERGY, before the onset of the Parkinson’s disease that marred his final years, makes it tempting to substitute his biography for a history of the church in the late twentieth century. Along with his closest aide, Joseph Ratzinger, who became his prefect for the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith in 1981 and his successor in 2005 as Benedict XVI, John Paul II set the terms of discussion within the church—and occasionally within the wider world—for more than a generation. Together, the two men would work for thirty-five years to reconstitute Catholic life in a world where, in Ratzinger’s view, “the classical supports of a Christian society have been destroyed.”¹³

John Paul II immediately reassessed how Catholics should navigate the challenges of the Cold War. Six months after his election, John Paul II returned to his native Poland. From the moment he arrived, with church bells pealing across the country as his plane touched down, his presence conveyed a more confrontational message than that carried by the cautious Vatican (and West German) policy of *Ostpolitik*. Speaking in Warsaw’s Victory Square, he noted that the underground Polish army had launched a doomed uprising in 1944 against the *Wehrmacht* from that very spot, while Soviet armies on the other side of the Vistula River refused to assist them. “In how many places in Europe and the world has [the Polish soldier] cried with his death,” he emphasized, “that there can be no just Europe without the independence of Poland marked on its map!”¹⁴ The crowds packing every event—25 percent of the Polish population attended a papal Mass in person—drove the point home. Newspapers and television cameras covered nothing else. This “most fantastic pilgrimage in the history of contemporary Europe,” in the words of Adam Michnik, became a tutorial on nonviolent resistance to the communist state.¹⁵

John Paul II did not instigate the formation of an independent trade union, Solidarity, a year later. But the “awakened consciences” of Polish workers, in the words of a contemporary analyst, stemmed in part from the exhilarating papal visit. The term “solidarity” had diverse roots, [p. 356] but its resonance within Catholic circles and in John Paul II’s writing was deep.¹⁶



Pope John Paul II in Kraków, Poland, 1979. (Bettman via Getty Images)

Within a year, the Solidarity movement enrolled a stunning ten million workers. At shipyards in the port city of Gdańsk, the epicenter of the movement, workers attended daily Mass around an altar inside Gate #2. On the gate they pinned a large color photograph of John Paul II. One of the workers, Lech Wałęsa, soon Solidarity's leader, began a practice of speaking about the goals of workers after the conclusion of the Mass. Polish bishops sent out communiques invoking *Gaudium et Spes* and the "right of workers to free association in unions which genuinely represent them."¹⁷ John Paul II published an encyclical outlining the need for "solidarity" in light of the "exploitation of the workers."¹⁸ In turn, the first official Solidarity statement of goals invoked the encyclical.¹⁹

The Polish government crushed this initial phase of the movement with the declaration of martial law and the imprisonment of many Solidarity leaders in December 1981. Still, the circulation of dissident materials and clandestine meetings between various opposition groups did not cease. American trade unions and Christian Democratic governments in Western Europe secretly provided financial aid. So, too, did the new American president, Ronald Reagan. Reagan's rhetoric [p. 357] was not subtle—he termed the Soviet Union the "evil empire"—but he shared with John Paul II a not-so-utopian conviction that the current geopolitical order would not endure.

At the same time, the stagflation (high unemployment and high inflation) tormenting the developed world in the 1970s, and the even more devastating economic crisis sweeping through the communist bloc, prompted new questions. Catholics more enamoured of free markets than the authors of papal encyclicals seized the opportunity to reassert the

importance of economic growth and entrepreneurship. Some of the first Catholics to do so emerged from the unlikely setting of Franco's Spain, where a group of priests and laypeople fused conservatism on moral and sexual matters with economic liberalism. The primary carriers of this ideology were members of Opus Dei, a religious movement founded in the early 1930s. The first generation of Opus Dei priests and lay affiliates did not challenge Franco's restrictions on civil liberties, but they dedicated themselves to a modernization of the Spanish economy, emphasizing ties with the European community and quietly countering Franco's instinct to isolate Spain from global markets.²⁰ They founded Spain's leading business school, the University of Navarra, in Pamplona in 1958 and established affiliated campuses across Latin America.²¹

Given his repeated warnings against consumerism, John Paul II fit no one's definition of a libertarian. Still, he challenged not just Soviet control of Poland, but the entire communist project, with its restrictions on freedom of religion, most of all, but also its restrictions on free markets. Unsurprisingly, John Paul II warmed to the traditional piety and market-friendly ethos of Opus Dei, and in 1982 he made Opus Dei a personal prelature reporting to the Vatican and not to local bishops. He fast-tracked the canonization of the movement's founder.

Similar ideas about the relationship between markets and human flourishing resonated in the United States. Here the protagonists were not Opus Dei technocrats but the onetime radical journalist Michael Novak, the writer and (later) papal biographer George Weigel, the Lutheran pastor and, after his conversion, Catholic priest Richard John Neuhaus, and the former secretary of the treasury William Simon. These men translated John Paul II's economic vision into a variant on Reagan-era Republican Party orthodoxy. Novak's 1982 *The Spirit of* [p. 358] *Democratic Capitalism*, dedicated to John Paul II, argued that capitalism properly understood protected human dignity far better than socialism or ill-formed notions of "class struggle." When the American bishops authored a pastoral letter urging government officials to substantially enhance services for the poor and reduce income inequality, positions that placed them to the left of the Democratic Party, Novak coordinated a statement lambasting the bishops for ignoring the virtues of "free economic institutions ... free economic activism, property rights, markets, incentives and invention."²² Neuhaus learned with delight that John Paul II and the papal household subscribed to his newly founded journal *First Things*.²³

The same alliances shaped a brief skirmish over the nuclear arms race. Even as Catholic views on the economy shifted to the left in the 1970s, so too did church leaders around the world become more pacifist, more skeptical of nuclear deterrence than would have seemed possible during Pius XII's papacy. Lay Catholic groups inspired by the council, most notably the Sant'Egidio group based in Rome, helped negotiate an end to conflicts in places as diverse as Mozambique and the Balkans. Bishops began to speak out. In 1983 alone, in reaction to the Reagan administration boost in defense spending and the NATO decision to place intermediate nuclear missiles in Western Europe, a dozen bishops'

conferences from Japan to Belgium to Hungary released statements decrying the arms race.²⁴

West German and American bishops issued the most sophisticated documents. In both countries, the process of drafting the letters, including numerous public discussions, signaled a new episcopal confidence on the public stage. The West German bishops and leading Catholic intellectuals engaged the leader of the West German Social Democratic Party in a dialogue on “peacemaking.”²⁵ Eminences such as George Kennan, a leading architect of American Cold War strategy in the 1940s, called the American bishops’ letter the “most profound and searching inquiry” of warfare in the nuclear age.²⁶

The same Catholics attracted to President Reagan’s free market views challenged these efforts to edge away from nuclear deterrence, with Michael Novak accusing the bishops of not “defending the innocent, by having no deterrent at all.”²⁷ The secretaries of defense and state [p. 359] in the Reagan administration, as well as the head of the National Security Council, registered their opposition. Reagan himself wrote John Paul II emphasizing his own determination to eliminate nuclear weapons, but he thought the first step required a nuclear buildup, not a freeze in arms production. When Reagan first met John Paul II, he showed him spy satellite photos of Soviet nuclear missile placements in Poland.

John Paul II summoned the leader of the United States bishops’ conference to Rome and urged him not to encourage unilateral disarmament or pacifism given Soviet militarization. He would soon appoint a former military chaplain, John O’Connor, as archbishop of New York. Privately convinced that the bishops underestimated Soviet recalcitrance, Reagan remained publicly upbeat. When queried at a press conference after the publication of the final draft of the bishops’ letter, Reagan insisted that the bishops and the administration “were doing the same thing.”²⁸

III

JOHN PAUL II MADE A second papal visit to Poland in 1983. Five hundred thousand people attended one event, one million the next, with crowds chanting the pope’s name. Solidarity remained banned, but John Paul II slipped the phrase “fundamental solidarity between human beings” into a homily, and the crowd roared with laughter and applause. “The first visit broke through a barrier of fear,” one intellectual speculated, “perhaps this one can break through the barrier of hopelessness.”²⁹ In Hungary, communist secret agents had infiltrated almost every Catholic group. In East Germany, the Stasi (Ministry for State Security) secretly tape-recorded parishioners in the confessional. But in Poland, independent Catholic activists and organizations remained major political actors.³⁰

A young Warsaw priest, Jerzy Popiełuszko, joined the crowds welcoming the pope. Sent by Cardinal Wyszyński to minister to workers in a steel mill, Popiełuszko’s sermons, broadcast over Radio Free Europe, attracted large audiences. His stress on “human dignity” invoked the Second Vatican Council just as his pleas to “live in truth” referenced Czech dissident Václav Havel.³¹ Popiełuszko’s kidnapping, the search for [p. 360] his

kidnappers, the discovery of his battered body tossed into a reservoir, and the arrest of unrepentant officials from the Interior Ministry mesmerized the nation. One of the largest crowds since the imposition of martial law gathered outside the church for Popiełuszko's funeral, with Solidarity activists such as Lech Wałęsa offering eulogies.

The alliance between church leaders and leading intellectuals strengthened. A Gdańsk shipyard pastor offered a homily in tribute to Adam Michnik, imprisoned for much of the decade, "for being loyal to the cause of human solidarity in Poland."³² When John Paul II visited Poland for a third time as pope, in 1987, he again made a point of using the word "solidarity" and defined it "as an essential part of the consistent message of the Church's social teaching."³³

The collapse of communist rule in Poland and Eastern Europe rested more on Mikhail Gorbachev's unwillingness to send tanks to Warsaw, Prague, and East Berlin than efforts by Polish activists or John Paul II. Still, the Catholic role was significant. As the Polish economy crumbled in the late 1980s, desperate communist leaders permitted the first free elections since the 1920s, and the political party formed out of Solidarity registered stunning triumphs. (The party did best in regions where Mass attendance was the highest.)³⁴ In September 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, friendly with John Paul II since the 1950s, a close observer of the Second Vatican Council, and a founder of Solidarity, became the first noncommunist prime minister of an independent Poland since before World War II. Two months later the Berlin Wall fell. Leaders of both the Soviet Union (before its dissolution) and the United States agreed to destroy part of their nuclear arsenal in treaties far more ambitious than any imagined during the debate on the arms race less than a decade before.

John Paul II assessed the post-Cold War world in 1991 with *Centesimus Annus*, an encyclical marking the one-hundredth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*. The pope consulted with numerous economists, including Jeffrey Sachs, the American leading Poland's transition from a communist command economy to a market system. Sachs compared Poland and Spain—two rural Catholic countries on Europe's periphery with populations and economies of roughly similar size in 1950, but [p. 361] with Spain's per capita income four times that of communist Poland by 1989.³⁵

More admiring of capitalism than his predecessors, John Paul II praised the free market as "the most efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effectively responding to needs."³⁶ In the United States, Richard John Neuhaus broke the press embargo on the encyclical and published a fawning assessment in the *Wall Street Journal* beneath the headline "The Pope Affirms the 'New Capitalism.'"³⁷

The headline was misleading. Even as he acknowledged the importance of markets, John Paul II added that "there are many human needs which find no place on the market." He lamented a "destructive competitiveness" imposed on workers and a "superficial" consumerism. He hoped that the world would not fall prey to an "unbridled affirmation of self-interest."³⁸ When he visited Poland again that same year, he scolded more than he

celebrated. He urged compatriots not to be “trapped by all of these forces of desire which slumber in you as a source of sin.”³⁹

IV

IF IN POLAND and much of Eastern Europe the struggle against communism culminated in independence and triumph, events in South Korea and the Philippines were equally thrilling. The contexts were different. South Korean Catholics numbered perhaps 10 percent of the population, although they were overrepresented in elite sectors because of a long-standing Catholic focus on education. In the Philippines, as in Poland, Catholics were an overwhelming majority. Eighty percent of the population claimed to attend Mass once a month, and Catholicism had long ago fused with national identity.⁴⁰ The most revealing comparison was with the Catholic experience in Latin America. Authoritarian dictators in both South Korea and the Philippines, like those in Argentina and Brazil, had long counted on Catholic support for strongman rule. Both in Latin America and East Asia an American economic and military presence remained palpable. In both regions, too, dictators used the threat of communist agitation to justify limits on civil liberties.

In South Korea and the Philippines, the texts of the Second Vati [p. 362] can Council, along with inspiration provided by liberation theologians, inspired new social movements. In South Korea, security police arrested Bishop Daniel Chi Hak-Soun in 1974 for aiding student demonstrators against the authoritarian government. The event—and Bishop Chi Hak-Soun’s insistence in a “Declaration of Conscience” that his criticism of the regime stemmed from his Catholicism—mobilized the country’s previously quiescent Catholic community.

Seoul’s Cardinal Stephen Kim, appointed by Paul VI in 1968, became the titular leader of a resistance movement that included both Protestants and Catholics. Kim had grown up in a poor family, entered the seminary, and spent several years in Münster, Germany, obtaining a sociology degree and ministering to migrant Korean miners and nurses and their families. He expressed passionate support for the Second Vatican Council and saw it as his mission to cultivate the public engagement championed in *Gaudium et Spes*. He regretted that the church in South Korea had for so long been focused on “its own good while neglecting other affairs in the world.” Myeongdong Cathedral, in Seoul, became a sanctuary for protesters in the 1980s, and activists circulated works by Gustavo Gutiérrez. In the culminating protest against the regime in 1987, just before its collapse, thousands of citizens and students camped inside and outside the cathedral. Kim informed government leaders that police attempting to arrest protesters would have to “trample on me first, priests secondly, and then sisters.”⁴¹

In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, stressing the link between stability, social justice, and the “conquest of mass poverty.” At the time, many Catholics supported Marcos and welcomed the “restoration of peace and order.”⁴² As in Latin America, though, human rights advocacy and liberation theology generated a new dynamic. *Populorum Progressio* was widely read, and the country’s bishops resolved

“more than ever [to] be a Church of the poor.”⁴³ Gustavo Gutiérrez’s writings had a major influence among men and women in religious orders and as in Latin America, North American and European missionaries played a significant role. Base communities formed on the Latin American model, and some Catholics nurtured collaborations with the local Communist Party. Military officials targeted Filipino Catholic activists and foreign missionaries during the era of martial law [p. 363] and conducted raids on church establishments. In response, one Filipino nun, Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, became the leader of a national task force to monitor torture and human rights violations and a major contributor to the work of Amnesty International.

The 1983 murder by security forces of Senator Benigno Aquino, the leader of the opposition to Marcos, eventually propelled Catholic leaders, notably Cardinal Jaime Sin, to turn to electoral politics. (The Manila archdiocese controlled the one radio station able to evade government censorship.) Sin openly supported the presidential candidacy of Corazon Aquino, the devout wife of the murdered opposition leader. President Marcos’s attempt to steal the 1986 election prompted Sin to mobilize crowds of up to two million people in a “people power” revolution that eventually overthrew the government, with pro-democracy Catholics at the center of the resistance. “If we did nothing,” the bishops wrote, “we would be party to our own destruction as a people.”⁴⁴

V

MORE AMBIGUOUS late Cold War dramas played out in South and Central America. Authoritarian leaders, typically generals, ruled most of the region in the 1970s and 1980s. Once upon a time these dictators and juntas could count on church officials as reliable allies. No longer. Across Latin America, Catholic activists took leading roles in opposition movements, often putting themselves at risk. Security forces murdered eight hundred priests, nuns, and lay Catholic activists across Latin America over the course of the 1970s. (More Catholics died resisting authoritarian governments in Latin America during the 1970s than resisting communism in Eastern Europe in the 1980s.) When members of the Argentinian military interrogated Catholic activists in Argentina, they accused John XXIII and Paul VI of “ruining” the church and detected “communism” in the documents drafted at Medellín.⁴⁵

How would John Paul II assess these tensions? When Karol Wojtyła met with Latin American bishops at a 1974 synod in Rome, he expressed hesitation. He acknowledged the injustice of the region’s prevailing inequality. Poland was also poor. But Wojtyła thought the focus needed to be on the “spiritual freedom of man, the freedom of the human soul, [p. 364] the freedom of conscience, the freedom of religion.” Or as he put it in a homily recorded by the Polish secret police:

We understand well that the act of human emancipation is multifaceted. It involves not only emancipating man from material misery, from the unjust social, political, and economic structures that cause such misery, but it also involves the emancipation of man in the spiritual sense, from all forms of limitation, from all forms of spiritual

slavery. It also involves matters like the freedom of conscience and freedom of religion.⁴⁶

Just two months into his papacy, John Paul II journeyed to Puebla, Mexico, to attend the first meeting of the Latin American bishops since the 1968 meeting in Medellín. A buoyant crowd of one million people greeted him when he landed in Mexico City, a celebration once unimaginable in a country where Catholic guerrillas and the Mexican army had clashed in a civil war as recently as the 1920s and where the Vatican still could not obtain diplomatic standing. (The pope traveled on an ordinary tourist visa.) John Paul II donned a sombrero for photographers and waved to the crowds pouring onto the street during his ten-mile ride from the airport to the metropolitan cathedral. He made a pilgrimage to the Basilica of Our Lady of Guadalupe, where the devout believed the Virgin Mary had appeared to Juan Diego in 1531, a place reminiscent, as John Paul II stressed in his remarks, of equally venerable Marian shrines in Poland.

In Puebla, John Paul II did not criticize liberation theology. But he criticized efforts to diminish Christ's divinity and depictions of "Jesus as politically committed, as one who fought against Roman oppression and the authorities, and also as one involved in the class struggle."⁴⁷ The Puebla meeting produced an unwieldy final document of no less than 1,310 paragraphs. Nonetheless, it coined a potent new phrase—"a preferential option for the poor"—that became shorthand not just for liberation theology but the more general orientation of the church in the region.

The challenge of applying this "preferential option" to concrete situations had already come into focus in Central America. In Nicaragua, Catholic bishops and leaders had long been associated with the Somoza family dynasty. But the documents of the Second Vatican Council and Medellín pointed in new directions, as did activism among students, supported by Jesuits working at the Universidad Centroamericana, in San Salvador.⁴⁸ American priests and nuns with experience in the region encouraged the US Congress to hold hearings on human rights in Central America, as both American and Nicaraguan clergy documented torture by security forces.⁴⁹

After Somoza fell in 1979, the Sandinista government posed new challenges. Catholics such as the liberation theologian and ecclesial base community leader Fr. Ernesto Cardenal took cabinet-level positions in the newly formed Sandinista government. Regions with the densest concentration of ecclesial base communities were the most supportive of the new regime.⁵⁰ Sandinista leaders congratulated themselves for making Christians an "integral part of our revolutionary history to a degree unprecedented in any other revolutionary movement in Latin America and possibly the world."⁵¹

Other Catholics, including Managua's archbishop, Miguel Obando y Bravo, had been opposed to the Somoza regime—Obando once accepted a Mercedes as a gift from President Somoza and immediately sold it and gave the funds to the poor—but now expressed reservations about the Sandinistas. Sandinista tolerance of restrictions on markets, free speech, and religion, combined with pious invocations of Fidel Castro's Cuba, set off alarm bells. Obando said Mass for leaders of the rebel Contra insurgency in

Miami even as the United States government funded the insurgents and coordinated an economic boycott.

John Paul II, too, voiced his displeasure. On landing at the Managua airport in 1983, the pope wagged an angry finger at Fr. Cardenal as the priest knelt on the tarmac for a blessing.⁵² Annoyed by chants of “power to the people” during a liturgy attended by five hundred thousand people in Managua’s main plaza, sweating profusely in 100-degree heat, the pope called out “silenzio” and denounced “godless communism” to little effect. In the United States, on national television, Ronald Reagan attacked Nicaraguans who “insulted and mocked the Pope.”⁵³

[p. 366] Preventing another Nicaragua in El Salvador became the goal in Washington, Rome, and San Salvador. Early patterns had been similar. Belgian missionaries from Louvain became affiliated with Catholic student groups in El Salvador in the mid-1960s. They encouraged students to move beyond traditional conceptions of private property and toward a stronger sense of the “common good and the right to land and life.” Reading groups and journals proliferated.⁵⁴

One El Salvadoran Jesuit, Rutilio Grande, drew international attention in the 1970s for his work with students. “In our country,” he insisted, “there exists a false democracy, a democracy in name only.” In one homily, he derided critics from the *Wall Street Journal* and “international high finance circles” who knew nothing of poverty. Instead, he invoked Paul VI on development and “the Martyrdom of the Church in various countries of Latin America.”⁵⁵

Grande’s own martyrdom occurred a month later. Right-wing security squads assassinated him, and among those asked to identify his body was San Salvador’s new archbishop, Óscar Romero. Romero’s training at the Colegio Pio Latino Americano in Rome and his work as a seminary rector had hardly prepared him for the cauldron of El Salvadoran politics. At Grande’s funeral, he hesitantly warned against “any liberation that does not move beyond this world’s ideologies, interests and realities.”⁵⁶ But Grande’s death radicalized Romero, and within the year he was speaking on the political situation to overflowing crowds at the city’s cathedral. On the anniversary of Grande’s death, he lauded the dead Jesuit’s vision of “authentic liberation” and his ability to help people “see in their poverty and suffering the source of salvation, liberation, and redemption.”⁵⁷

Celebrated by reporters, human rights activists, and socially minded Catholics, Romero used his fame to leverage support for political reforms. He shuttled between leftist revolutionaries, Christian Democratic politicians, and military leaders. He attended funerals for murdered trade unionists and teachers and explained to a dubious papal nuncio why his presence was “faithful to the spirit of Vatican II, translated for Latin America by Medellín and Puebla.”⁵⁸

In Rome, Romero met with John Paul II, but left the meeting dis [p. 367] couraged by the pope’s references to complaints within El Salvador about Romero’s activism. By this time, although Romero did not know it, Carter administration officials were asking John Paul II

to ensure that Romero played a “responsible and constructive role.”⁵⁹ By contrast, he felt supported by West German Catholics who funded his initiatives through their development agencies. He received an honorary degree from the Catholic university at Louvain, where he explained that “persecution [of the Church] has been occasioned by the defense of the poor.”⁶⁰



Archbishop Óscar Romero. (Image ID: PRETHK, Alamy)

On February 17, 1980, Romero pleaded with the United States to stop sending military aid to El Salvador and “truly defend human rights.”⁶¹ Before another huge crowd, in an address broadcast via radio across Latin America, Romero referenced the Second Vatican Council, the meeting of the Latin American bishops at Medellín, and Amnesty International as he made an impassioned plea to stop state-sponsored violence. “The church,” he concluded, “preaches your liberation just as we have studied it in the Holy Bible today.” The congregation interrupted the homily with applause five times.⁶²

[p. 368] A week later, on March 24, 1980, while saying Mass, Romero was shot dead by members of the security forces he had denounced. Later that same year, members of the same security forces raped and killed three missionary American nuns and a laywoman. Jean Donovan, the laywoman, a twenty-seven-year-old from Cleveland, had trained as an accountant before searching for more meaningful work. She had lived in El Salvador for just over a year. She saw Archbishop Romero as a “great guy. He is the leader of Liberation Theology in practice.... He really is the voice of the people.” She found “Christ a lot more in a group of lay people joined in prayer, genuinely caring for one another, than

in John Paul II and giant masses in Washington or wherever.” One of her last letters was to Senator Edward Kennedy, pleading with him to “stop the actions of our government.”⁶³



Four American churchwomen murdered in El Salvador in 1980. Clockwise from top left: Sr. Dorothy Kazel, Sr. Maura Clark, Jean Donovan, Sr. Ita Ford. (Courtesy of Maryknoll Archives)

United States Ambassador Robert White, also a Catholic, had dined with the four American churchwomen on the night before their deaths. He supervised the exhumation of their bodies and became a thorn in the side of the new Reagan administration by emphasizing the need to apprehend the murderers. John Paul II also mourned the deaths of Romero and the American churchwomen, but if in Poland John Paul II encouraged defiance of a dictatorial government, in Central America he worried about a destabilizing radicalism. Reagan administration officials commenting on the murders of the four churchwomen were callous. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, soon to be appointed American ambassador to the United Nations, insisted that the “nuns were not just nuns ... they were political activists.”

Over the next decade, divisions among Catholics deepened as the civil war continued, with a devastating death toll for a small nation. American secretary of state Alexander Haig, himself Catholic with a brother who was a Jesuit, thought “liberal Catholics” in El Salvador and [p. 369] the United States did little more than echo Soviet and Cuban talking points. Senate Republicans held hearings on the connection between “theologies of liberation” and “violent Marxist revolution.”⁶⁴ Meanwhile, more liberal Catholics in the United States and Europe, including former Ambassador White and a young Democratic senator from Delaware, Joseph Biden, insisted that American aid to El Salvador be tied to

the arrest and conviction of the men who had killed the four missionaries. The keynote speaker at the 1984 Democratic Convention, New York's Catholic governor Mario Cuomo, denounced Republicans for giving "money to Latin American governments that murder nuns, and then lie about it."⁶⁵

That same year, El Salvadorans elected as president a Christian Democrat, José Napoleón Duarte, who arranged for the conviction of five national guardsmen for the killing of the churchwomen. El Salvadoran security forces, in another spasm of violence, murdered six Jesuits, including one of the region's leading liberation theologians, Ignacio Ellacuría, as well as their housekeeper and her daughter in 1989, a week after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The murders prompted more protests organized by Catholics in Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States.

The context, though, was now different. As head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Joseph Ratzinger had already begun to discipline liberation theologians he deemed heterodox. He published a statement criticizing Gustavo Gutiérrez for his "uncritical acceptance of the Marxist conception of history."⁶⁶

More broadly, capitalism as a method of organizing the economy now seemed inevitable, even just. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Europeans rushed to abandon Soviet-style planning. The expansion of global markets had already brought tens of millions of once impoverished residents of South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore into the middle class. The most prosperous Latin American countries, such as Chile, were those most integrated into international trading patterns. These capitalist triumphs posed a conceptual challenge to Brazilian bishops working with ecclesial base communities, who continued to invoke "socialism" as "God's Kingdom on Earth."⁶⁷ Gutiérrez and other [p. 370] liberation theologians jettisoned a "Marxist version" of class struggle for a more anthropological, less overtly political examination of how the religious experience of the poor could instruct Catholics.⁶⁸

Absent the Cold War, Latin America moved from the center of international diplomacy to its margins. Catholics in the US Congress, led by Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill, whose aunt was a Maryknoll nun, limited the ability of officials in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations to fund the Contra army attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government. In 1990, the Sandinistas were defeated in free elections. In 1992, El Salvador's government signed a peace accord with guerrilla forces. The world's most important leftist political party, Brazil's Workers' Party, still depended on socially minded Catholics for its electoral popularity, but its successes seemed anomalous in an increasingly capitalist age.⁶⁹

John Paul II proclaimed an era's end. His focus turned away from Latin America and toward the rebuilding of Catholic institutions in the liberated Baltic countries, Eastern Europe, and Ukraine. He regretted that "the sincere desire to be on the side of the oppressed and not to be cut off from the course of history" had led some Catholics to seek "an impossible compromise between Marxism and Christianity."⁷⁰ Joseph Ratzinger

thought it time to close the liberation theology chapter. The collapse of communism, he wrote, “turned out to be a kind of twilight of the Gods for that theology.”⁷¹

VI

CATHOLICISM in sub-Saharan Africa moved on a different trajectory. The buoyancy of the 1960s in newly independent African nations matched the optimism of the Second Vatican Council. No longer would the church “appear as a religion in service to the political and cultural imperialism of the West,” a Cameroonian priest explained.⁷²

Many of the African countries gaining independence had Catholics as their first presidents, including Léopold Senghor in Senegal and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania. The “faithful socialism” Senghor attempted to develop in Senegal, as well as Nyerere’s version of socialism in Tanzania, had both Catholic and African roots. Nyerere agreed to speak at the motherhouse of the Maryknoll nuns in Ossining, New York, because he [p. 371] had worked with Maryknoll nuns in Tanzania. He referenced *Populorum Progressio* and urged Catholics “to recognize the need for social revolution and to play a leading role in it.”⁷³ Paul VI and Nigeria’s bishops mobilized these African Catholic presidents and a vast Catholic relief apparatus to alleviate the humanitarian crisis caused by Biafra’s secession from Nigeria in 1967 and the subsequent civil war.⁷⁴

Catholic toleration of apartheid regimes ended. The anti-apartheid movement in South Africa was led by secular and Protestant Black activists, but a few Catholics, such as Durban archbishop Denis Hurley, determinedly supported this vanguard. Catholics played a more significant role in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), where Bishop Donal Lamont and a handful of Catholics became some of the most important internal critics of their government. Dominican nuns admitted “colored” students to their “white” schools in acts of civil disobedience. Lamont accused a white Catholic minister for the government of practicing “moral terrorism” on the African majority.⁷⁵

One dimension of African Catholicism in the post-conciliar era was the development of African-led institutions. In Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in the late 1960s and 1970s, African seminarians repeatedly went on strike, convinced that their English Jesuit professors treated them with a racist condescension. The seminarians alleged that their instructors judged them barely capable of being “simple parish priests”; they demanded that African priests join the teaching staff.⁷⁶ Faculty from Louvain, in Belgium, founded a faculty of theology at Lovanium University, in the Congo. Its members produced some of the first twentieth-century theological texts composed by Africans.⁷⁷

About one-fifth of the 311 African bishops at the Second Vatican Council were native Africans, and fourth-fifths were European or American missionaries. The appointment of native African bishops proceeded quickly, though, and they were a majority by the mid-1970s. Priests and bishops from Latin America had long held the most important posts in that region, but now natives from Africa and South and East Asia took on key leadership roles both in their native countries and, increasingly, in Rome.⁷⁸

Generally, post-conciliar Catholic leaders in Africa became more attached to global Catholic structures, not less. Developments in Uganda are revealing. The Great Lakes region of Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, [p. 372] and Burundi became the African Catholic heartland in the twentieth century, with Catholics either a majority or close to a majority in each country. In Uganda, atypically, native Ugandans, not foreign missionaries, held the most important church offices as early as 1950. The first African-born bishop, Joseph Kiwanuka, had trained in Rome as a canon lawyer and written a dissertation (in Latin) on Christian marriage, a daring topic for a student from a region where polygamy remained widespread. The schools Kiwanuka built, the devotions he encouraged, and the Latin he drilled into his seminarians—some were said to speak it more fluently than English—made his diocese of Masaka resemble a similarly structured diocese in, say, Austria.⁷⁹ Ugandan parishes remained poor—into the 1970s not a single parish in one diocese owned a working phone—and the model of evangelization through catechists and the building of parishes and schools remained traditional. An innovation was that many catechists now possessed a bicycle and were able to pedal from village to village.⁸⁰

At the Second Vatican Council, Kiwanuka spoke eloquently of the need for Indigenous music to be integrated into the liturgy. He organized a ceremony in St. Peter's Square where Paul VI canonized twenty Ugandan martyrs killed in 1884, and beatified in 1920, with the voices of an African choir harmonizing over the beat of African drums. (Forty thousand Ugandans attended a parallel canonization Mass in Kampala.) In the first papal journey to Africa, Paul VI visited Uganda for three days in 1969, paying tribute to the same Ugandan martyrs and meeting with the region's bishops and Catholic politicians. He claimed "no other desire than to foster what you already are: Africans and Catholics."⁸¹

Given this optimism, the descent of so many African states—Uganda, certainly, but Nigeria, Ghana, and many others as well—into authoritarian rule or civil war proved all the more disheartening. Postcolonial democracy in Africa, it turned out, would not be the stable party system familiar to North Americans and Western Europeans (at least since 1945), but a kaleidoscope of shifting coalitions. The head of the Democratic (and deeply Catholic) Party in Uganda, Benedicto Kiwanuka worked closely with Archbishop Kiwanuka (no relation). Just as Archbishop Kiwanuka developed ties to the broader Catholic world by studying in Rome, Benedicto Kiwanuka studied law in London and [p. 373] came to see himself and his party as embarked on a project paralleling the Christian Democratic Union in West Germany or the Catholic People's Party in the Netherlands. He was elected the country's first prime minister in 1962, but could not prevent his successor from suspending Parliament and plunging Uganda into strongman rule in 1966. He urged a continuation of democracy. "A country's Constitution," Kiwanuka wrote, should not be "thrown away by a single person as easily as throwing a dirty handkerchief in a bedroom basket."⁸²



Two Catholic politicians: Benedicto Kiwanuka, chief minister of Uganda, and John F. Kennedy, president of the United States, 1961. (Abbie Rowe. *White House Photographs*. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston)

Idi Amin's regime, beginning in 1971, sent Uganda into further disarray. Benedicto Kiwanuka had at first accepted Amin's leadership and even taken an appointment as chief justice. (The two men and their families shared one Christmas dinner.) Catholics were never a particular target of Amin's wrath, but independent sources of power were, and Amin soon embarked on a campaign against foreign influence in Uganda that extended to Catholics as pawns of a global church. He expelled fifty-five priests from the country and arranged for Benedicto Kiwanuka to be kidnapped as he left morning Mass. On Amin's orders, Kiwanuka was then savagely tortured and executed. Amin later [p. 374] ordered the assassination of the priest-editor of the country's leading Catholic newspaper, in part because of his investigation into Benedicto Kiwanuka's death.⁸³

VII

EXPERTS IN THE 1960S had predicted that Christianity, Protestant and Catholic, would fade in importance after so many African countries achieved independence. Missionary schools might have educated African elites, but after independence, state institutions would take on that role. Guinea's first president, Sékou Touré, refused to permit Catholic schools and even imprisoned his childhood friend, Guinea's archbishop, for several years to signal complete independence from European institutions.⁸⁴

But Guinea was an exception. The Catholic growth rate in Africa was higher than in any other region and higher than the growth rate of the African population. John Paul II made thirteen separate trips to the continent, visiting almost every country. His evident joy when traveling in Africa stemmed from the buoyancy with which he was received and perhaps from the resemblance to the Poland of his youth, with its large families and packed seminaries and convents. Among the saints John Paul II canonized was Sr. Josephine Bakhita, once enslaved in the Sudan, then an Italian nun, and now a symbol of Catholic support for human rights and resistance to human trafficking.

(Catholic-sponsored Radio Bakhita became South Sudan's leading radio station in the early twenty-first century.)⁸⁵ One Nigerian seminary enrolled more students than any other seminary in the world, and the pattern of sending African priests to Western Europe and North America for parish assignments (and funds for their home dioceses) became widespread.⁸⁶

In country after country, Catholic schools played a significant role in the educational enterprise, and Catholic hospitals supplied much medical care. Their relative independence, in an era of failed African states, commended them. In Zambia, to take a typical example, Catholics provided up to 60 percent of the country's medical care in rural areas. They ran 15 percent of the country's schools, ranging from grade schools to a Catholic university. The reputations of the schools made them attractive to students and parents, and their graduates proved more likely than peers to take places at universities and assume leadership roles.

Many African Catholic dioceses, parishes, and institutions remained dependent on European and North American funding through development agencies such as Catholic Relief Services (United States), Adveniat (Germany), Trócaire (Ireland), Cordaid (Holland), and the 165 Catholic aid groups that constituted the Caritas Internationalis network. The same uneasiness about corruption or inadequate supervision within state institutions that led parents to enroll children in Catholic schools or visit Catholic medical clinics also encouraged international aid agencies to channel funds through Catholic networks. Dioceses and parishes started to administer microfinance, water sanitation, and conflict resolution projects. Jesuit Refugee Services, for example, founded in 1980, spent over half of its budget in Africa in a typical year, and over half of these funds came from governments and UN agencies.

Here the risk became that development projects, however integral to the Catholic mission, might swamp the capacity of church leaders to perform more conventional religious tasks.⁸⁷ Sustaining a Catholic identity in their institutions was also challenging. Fee-paying parents (and at times governments) might resent theology classes or mandatory liturgies or courses whose emphasis on social justice (after the Second Vatican Council) cast an unwelcome light on local political arrangements. The willingness to admit non-Catholic students after the Second Vatican Council gestured toward ecumenicism (and financial stability) but also made institutional identity less coherent. In 1969, religious brothers and women religious made up one-third of the staff in Zambian Catholic

schools; in 2004, just 3 percent. At some well-regarded Catholic schools in central Africa but also in India and other locations in the Global South, Catholics were only one-third or less of the pupils.⁸⁸

Unlike in Europe and North America, secularization touched only the most urbanized parts of the African continent, but religious competition among Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims existed everywhere. A Pentecostal, or charismatic, renewal movement, including speaking in tongues and direct encounters with the Holy Spirit, emerged in the United States in the early twentieth century and spread across the world, eventually touching hundreds of millions of people. The roots of this [p. 376] Pentecostalism lay within an often anti-Catholic wing of Protestantism, but after the Second Vatican Council, unexpectedly, a charismatic or Pentecostal movement became embedded within the Catholic church. The detachment of Pentecostal leaders from ordinary diocesan structures and the destabilizing emphasis on a personal encounter with the Holy Spirit created anxieties among bishops similar to those felt by their predecessors at Lourdes and elsewhere in the nineteenth century when Mary appeared to ordinary believers and attracted unruly crowds of the devout. Belgium's Cardinal Suenens attended Catholic Pentecostal meetings incognito for five days in the United States before conveying his endorsement of the movement to Paul VI.⁸⁹

Never more than a small presence in North America and Western Europe, Catholic Pentecostalism became influential in Africa, Brazil, and India. In a typical pattern, a priest and nun from South Bend, Indiana, after working with middle-class Catholics in the United States, brought Pentecostal practices to western Uganda in the Fort Portal region in the early 1980s. Merging the healing practices and devotions of nineteenth-century ultramontanist and twentieth-century Pentecostalism proved surprisingly easy: both traditions saw the world as locked in a struggle between God and Satan.⁹⁰

At times, Catholics absorbed witchcraft practices (in Uganda and Cameroon) and sorcery (in Zaire). Here the challenge of inculturation became evident. If church officials repudiated such practices and the healing ceremonies that accompanied them, they lost adherents. If they included them, they stretched orthodoxy beyond recognizable limits. The Ghanaian bishops produced manuals on the charismatic movement, acknowledging that healing and exorcisms marked Christ's ministry, but demanding "wise pastoral guidance and discernment of spirits."⁹¹

In Zambia, Emmanuel Milingo, educated by White Father missionaries and appointed archbishop of Lusaka in 1969, began to practice faith healings and exorcisms for large crowds. In 1982, Paul VI forced Milingo to resign his position as archbishop and move to Rome. There he married and formed a breakaway church.⁹² Less provocatively, a Cameroonian priest and theologian, Meinrad Hebga, a Jesuit with a doctorate from the Sorbonne and a pioneer in calling for an African-led church in the 1950s, established a healing ministry. He, too, had [p. 377] first encountered Pentecostal Catholicism in the United States. Meeting with groups of followers in Cameroon, Hebga anointed men and women claiming damage from witchcraft or diabolical possession, as well as initiating dialogues

with supplicants about their day-to-day challenges. Until his death in 2008, Hebga served as the spiritual guide for two hundred groups of Cameroonian Catholic charismatics. He traveled to London and Paris to meet with offshoot groups founded by Cameroonian migrants.⁹³

VIII

AS IN POLAND, South Korea, the Philippines, and much of Latin America, democracy in sub-Saharan Africa deepened its Catholic roots. During the 1970s, except in the apartheid nations of Rhodesia and South Africa, where they became more outspoken in opposition to white minority rule, African Catholic leaders had tended to focus on preserving the Catholic institutions they led.

The end of the Cold War allowed more maneuvering room. Reluctance on the part of the United States and other Western nations to prop up anti-communist dictators after 1989 encouraged a second wave of democratization that proved more enduring than the post-independence democratic movements of the 1960s. In Francophone Africa, Catholic visibility was striking. Benin's archbishop presided over the national conference convened to draft a constitution. He governed the country until the first free election. In Gabon and Togo, bishops played similar roles, as they did in Zaire and the Congo.⁹⁴

Bishops and lay Catholic leaders were only slightly less influential in the former British colonies. In Malawi, Catholics numbered less than 20 percent of the population, but the bishops' pastoral letter entitled *The Truth Will Set You Free* became the single most important public criticism of Malawi's one-party state. The letter began with a reference to the preferential option for the poor and regret that "many people still live in circumstances which are hardly compatible with their dignity as sons and daughters of God." John Paul II had visited Malawi in 1989 and encouraged both democracy and respect for human rights. When in 1992 it was announced that a popular majority had voted for a multi [p. 378] party government, a jubilant crowd marched, significantly, to the local bishop's house.⁹⁵

A gruesome exception to this pattern of Catholics building more stable democracies occurred in Rwanda. The 1994 genocide there—with eight hundred thousand people slaughtered in one hundred days—had multiple causes. Still, Catholic acceptance or even encouragement of ethnic divides between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples, dating back to the era of Belgian colonization, was among the most potent. In the 1950s, French and Belgian White Father missionaries helped persuade the colonial government to place primarily Hutu Catholics—roughly 80 percent of the population—into leadership positions. A bloody 1959 revolt ended the monarchy and forced thousands of Tutsi into exile in neighboring Uganda and Burundi.

Rwanda's first president after gaining independence from Belgium in 1962, Grégoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, had edited a Catholic newspaper and run a Catholic cooperative.⁹⁶ But he did little to thwart episodic Hutu killings of Tutsi students. Church leaders formally

condemned the violence, but pleading with readers to love one's neighbor, "even if he is an enemy," seemed more accepting of conflict than eager to end it. One Italian missionary described the scene at his parish as a "spectacle of blood, fighting, pillaging and fires above all." He asked, "How can I celebrate Mass in a community divided by hate? How can I give the sacraments to a community in which the majority has been complicit in these events, led by politicians with a diabolical plan to eliminate the Tutsi?"⁹⁷

Like so much of sub-Saharan Africa, Rwanda had a promising democratic dawn after 1989, when Catholic leaders, especially the editors of the national Catholic newspaper, attempted to guide the country toward a multiparty democracy. The country's bishops released a letter decrying ethnic division and inequality. But after the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi died in a mysterious plane crash in 1994, simmering conflicts metastasized into a war of extremist Hutu against Tutsi (and even moderate Hutu). The massacres provoked acts of desperate heroism, including Hutu priests and nuns sacrificing their lives while defending Tutsi parishioners. One Hutu nun, Sr. Felicitas Niyitegeka, ferried Tutsi across the border into Zaire and was captured upon her [p. 379] return. Because her brother was a colonel in the army, she was offered a chance to save her life, but she refused to abandon her colleagues and the Tutsi they protected. She was subsequently murdered and thrown naked into a common grave. Rwanda's bishops condemned the violence in abstract terms, without mentioning terrorism directed against the Tutsi. A few priests and nuns participated in the genocide, even killing trembling coreligionists seeking sanctuary within church buildings.⁹⁸

Here inculturation meant an incapacity to reach across ethnic divides. A papal envoy, French cardinal Roger Etchegaray, crisscrossed the country during the genocide, attempting to reconcile warring parties. He regretted that the "blood of tribalism proved deeper than the waters of baptism."⁹⁹ John Paul II did not fly to Rwanda and try to broker an end to the slaughter as some commentators urged. (Neither did the secretary general of the United Nations, the president of France, or the president of the United States.) When confronted with evidence of priests and nuns participating in the genocide, the pope denounced such actions, but in a defensive way. "The Church in itself," he insisted, "cannot be held responsible for the misdeeds of its members who have acted against evangelical law."¹⁰⁰

This distinction—between a pure church and its sinful members—was entirely traditional. It would soon come under scrutiny because it deflected questions about how institutions formed individuals, who in turn manipulated institutions. This relationship between institutions and individuals lay at the core of another problem long shrouded in secrecy: clergy sex abuse. Reckoning with that horror was just beginning.

Notes to Chapter 14

Original chapter endnotes, with numbering preserved.

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