

JOHN T. MCGREEVY · CATHOLICISM

Chapter 7: Nation

A Catholic Nationalism?

DWC 201 · October 19, 2026 · Original book pages 156-186

From *Catholicism: A Global History from the French Revolution to Pope Francis* (W. W. Norton, 2022). This reading is reflowed from the digital edition. Bracketed page markers identify the original book pages; PDF page numbers differ. Chapter notes follow the reading.

[p. 156]

I

MA XIANGBO WAS born in 1840 and raised in Jiangsu, a region north of Shanghai and on the Yellow Sea. Vincent Lebbe was born in 1873 and raised in Ghent, Belgium. The two men met after Lebbe began his missionary career in Shanghai in 1901.

A member of a family whose ancestors had converted to Catholicism in the seventeenth century, Ma attended the College of St. Ignace from grade school until his ordination as a Jesuit priest.¹ When Ma became director of his alma mater, other colleagues resisted his plan to reform the curriculum so as to allow the study of Chinese texts. Dismayed by this hesitation, eager for more contact with his family, and aggravated by perceived slights, such as superiors insisting that he teach astronomy, not Chinese literature, he left the Jesuits. “I have never been a French member of the Society,” he told his superiors, emphasizing the adjective “French.”² Not all the Jesuits in Shanghai were French—his beloved mentor was Italian—but Ma resented how treaties signed in the 1840s gave French Catholics and the French government the right to supervise Catholic activity in China.

Ma married and fathered two children. Working on behalf of the Chinese imperial government, he traveled throughout Europe and North America. He kept a discreet silence about his Catholicism [p. 157] because of anti-foreign, often anti-Christian, sentiments permeating the royal court. A meeting with Pope Leo XIII in Rome in 1886 while on a diplomatic mission began Ma’s reconciliation with the church.



Ma Xiangbo, 1935. (*Ma Xiangbo 2* Whitworth University (2017). Album 13: Catholic Action First National Congress in Shanghai, 1935. <https://digitalcommons.whitworth.edu/album13/90>)



Vincent Lebbe in Tianjin in 1910. (*Archives Vincent Lebbe-ARCA.*)

With Chinese colleagues and the support of a few French Jesuits, Ma founded Zhendan University in 1902, whose Western name, Aurora, invoked not only the dawn but the collective hope of a generation of Chinese intellectuals to fuse Western and Eastern knowledge. The French Jesuits shied away from politics and over Ma's objections altered the curriculum to a more conventional focus on Western classics. Ma resigned and persuaded many of the school's students to enroll in a new university, Fudan, which he founded in 1905. He arranged for the reprinting of works by the seventeenth-century missionary, Matteo Ricci, contrasting Ricci's capacity for integration into Chinese culture with the rigidities of nineteenth-century ultramontanistism. He later wrote Pius X urging him to send scholars with the sensibility of Ricci to China.³

An eleven-year-old Vincent Lebbe vowed to go to China after reading a biography of a French priest martyred there. Even before his arrival many years later he knew how missionaries should conduct themselves. "To be effective," he wrote, we must "stay in tune with our time, adapt to its customs, ideas and manners of expression."⁴

After only a few months in China, Lebbe identified completely with his adopted homeland. "I am Chinese," he wrote to a friend, "with all my heart, with all my soul, and with all my strength. China is my lot and my country, and the Chinese are my brothers." He signed the letter with his Chinese name, Lei Ming-yuan.⁵ He read and endorsed the French priest Léon Joly's controversial work on the need for missionaries to adapt to Chinese culture and thought Joly had "held to the letter of the Gospel."⁶ After Joly's death, one of Joly's friends gave Lebbe his chalice as a token of esteem.⁷

Like Ma and Joly, Lebbe was appalled by the behavior of many French missionaries. Some French priests, like French colonial administrators, rode in rickshaws. Lebbe rode a bicycle. Some of these same missionaries made only half-hearted efforts to learn Mandarin and rarely wore Chinese clothes. Lebbe spoke idiomatic Mandarin, braided his hair in a pigtail, and insisted on using chopsticks. French colonial officials discouraged papal envoys from visiting the country and thwarted requests from an enfeebled Chinese government to establish independent diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Lebbe described the neo-Gothic cathedral in Beijing, built in the 1890s and rising majestically over the city skyline only a short distance from the Forbidden City, as an "eyesore." Its style was "deliberately non-Chinese."⁸

Ma supported the Chinese Revolution of 1911, became a prominent lecturer on the new constitution, and was elected as the only Catholic in China's parliament. By then posted to Tianjin, Lebbe offered well-attended public lectures on Catholicism and on the need for Chinese independence from foreign control. Together with Chinese Catholic colleagues, he edited a newspaper that attracted one of China's biggest [p. 159] readerships. A dismayed French consul reported to the foreign ministry in Paris that "the people, aroused by the prefect of police and also, I regret to say, by the Belgian missionary Lebbe, who is poorly controlled by his bishop, may at any moment be drawn into violent acts." The French consul and Lebbe's ecclesiastical superiors agreed to move Lebbe out of Tianjin, but

Lebbe turned the patriotism displayed by French Catholics during World War I to his advantage.

It has been the patriotism of the church in France during the years of war that more than anything else has returned the church there to the role it had lost.... What they do not forgive me is that I believe that, to save the Chinese, today especially, one must love not only the Chinese, but China, as one loves one's homeland, as a Frenchman loves France, to work to spread this love among priests, Christians, and pagans.⁹

French missionaries in China disagreed. "It seems," one bishop explained, "that the *European* Catholic episcopate will remain for a long time yet the only safeguard of the Catholic link with *Rome* and the sole upholder of practical belief in the infallible magisterium of the *church*."

A skeptical curial official wrote on the letter from the French bishop in blue pencil: "And why? And whose fault is that?"¹⁰ His frustration reflected the gap between the Roman desire to cultivate local leadership and an insular French missionary culture. Benedict XV dispatched emissaries to investigate the condition of the church in China. Among their informants were Lebbe and Ma. "If true patriotism is praiseworthy and praised in the churches of Europe," Lebbe had already insisted, "it is necessary to the Church of China, and one of the indispensable human conditions for Catholicism taking root in the people and drawing the masses to its bosom."¹¹ That a French flag hung in many Catholic churches was scandalous.¹²

In 1919, Benedict XV released an apostolic letter on the missions, *Maximum Illud*, that drew from Lebbe's writings. Evangelization without the goal of an Indigenous church was unacceptable. "The ideas ... are [p. 160] 'our ideas,' " an excited friend reported to Lebbe.¹³ Ma translated *Maximum Illud* into Chinese. French clergy in China were less enthralled. One privately called the apostolic letter "unjust" and "discouraging." Benedict XV, they said, was "badly informed."¹⁴

Lebbe spent much of the 1920s in Paris and Belgium working with Chinese and Vietnamese Catholic students. He urged the Chinese students to adopt two mottos: "China for the Chinese" and "the Church for Christ."¹⁵ Ma helped the Vatican establish an apostolic delegation to China, headed by an Italian bishop, Celso Constantini. (Ma was chagrined not to be named ambassador to the Vatican in return.) Constantini labored over the next decade to fulfill the promise of *Maximum Illud* by convening clergy synods, discouraging Chinese Catholics from *koutou*, or kneeling, when meeting clergy, forbidding national flags in churches, sending seminarians to Rome for training, and encouraging experiments in Chinese-style church architecture (as opposed to neo-Gothic). As he explained, "the missions have remained foreign fiefs, without ever becoming local churches."¹⁶



The first six Chinese bishops of the modern era, at St. Peter's in 1926. (*Archives Vincent Lebbe-ARCA.*)

Pius XI plotted an even more dramatic gesture. Lebbe had once written that “I would die happy if I could kiss the ring of the second [Chinese] bishop of China”—the first Chinese bishop had been ordained in 1685.¹⁷ Pius XI fulfilled Lebbe’s wish in 1926 when he plucked six [p. 161] Chinese clergy—three from a list supplied by Lebbe—to be ordained in Rome as the first native bishops in Southeast or East Asia. (An Indian Jesuit had been ordained bishop in 1923.) With much fanfare, the soon-to-be bishops traveled to Rome via Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, and Colombo.¹⁸ Invited to the ordinations as a distinguished guest, Lebbe exuded vindication. “God is good,” he wrote to a friend, as he anticipated a reception in Rome for the new Chinese bishops. “I am invited to give [in Rome] a lecture on indigenous clergy!” During the ceremonies surrounding these “historic hours, these unforgettable hours,” he felt the “greatest joy possible for a missionary.”¹⁹ Afterward, he founded an order of Chinese brothers and an order of Chinese sisters. He mandated that these Little Brothers of Saint John the Baptist and Little Sisters of Saint Theresa use Chinese (not only Latin) in their daily prayers.²⁰

II

THE SAGA OF Ma Xiangbo and Vincent Lebbe illuminates the challenge of building a global church in a nationalist age. After defending themselves against liberal nationalists in the 1870s, Catholics came out of World War I convinced they could be good patriots and good Catholics. The shared experience of the war had simultaneously lessened anticlericalism and reconciled many Catholics to the nation-state. Germany's Catholic political party, the Zentrum, placed the term *Volksgemeinschaft*, or "national community," on its banners and publicity materials. The French government honored Joan of Arc, long a symbol of the anti-liberal Catholic right, with a national holiday in 1920, the same year that Benedict XV canonized her in Rome.²¹

The collapse of the Habsburg Empire also enhanced this Catholic nationalism. Bishops in the new state of Czechoslovakia vowed to "love, also in its new form, our Fatherland." Croatian, Slovakian, Slovenian, and Hungarian Catholics exhibited a newfound conviction in the need for unity between particular peoples and a particular state.²² Poland's Roman Dmowski, one of the leading political figures in a Poland that had gained political independence only in 1918, published a pamphlet explaining his understanding of Polish nationalism:

[p. 162] Catholicism is not an appendage to Polishness.... It is embedded in its essence, and in a large measure it *is* its essence. To attempt to dissociate Catholicism from Polishness, and to separate the Polish nation from its religion and the church, means to destroy the very essence of that nation.²³

The same pattern was evident beyond Europe. In Brazil, for example, the energetic archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, Sebastião Leme, authored a widely distributed 1916 manifesto urging Brazilian Catholics to take ownership of their society. "The Brazil that we see," he explained, "the Nation Brazil, is not ours. It is the minority's."²⁴ A Jesuit in British-controlled Ceylon urged local Catholics to avoid condemnations from the majority Buddhist population by becoming more patriotic.²⁵ In Senegal, missionaries preached "immortal glory to France" as they encouraged local men to volunteer for military service or looked the other way during forced recruitment drives. They boasted that French officials "have nothing to fear from the African Catholic."²⁶

This Catholic nationalism informed Vatican diplomacy. The failed attempt of Benedict XV to negotiate an end to World War I in 1917 and the warm reception afforded Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points unnerved papal diplomats. One such diplomat, Eugenio Pacelli, the future Pius XII, assessed Wilson's goal as to "Americanize the whole world, making it Freemason so as to liberate it from its servitude to the Kaiser, the pope, and the priesthood."²⁷ Wilson, equally suspicious, told his cabinet that he thought Benedict XV planned to establish Roman Catholic nations in central Europe under "control of the papacy."²⁸

Excluded from the League of Nations, a decision that embittered a generation of papal diplomats, Catholics forged their own alliances. With Benedict XV's encouragement,

Pacelli and another future pope, Achille Ratti, elected Pius XI in 1922, began negotiating treaties or concordats with European and Latin American leaders. (Medieval Europe, Pius XI explained, had been a “true League of Nations.”) About forty concordats were signed in the interwar period.²⁹

These papal diplomats tried to persuade scholars and government officials that neutrality on religious matters along the American or [p. 163] French (after 1905) model should not become normative. If an individual’s salvation depended on good standing within the church, and Catholic leaders had no doubt that it did, a state should promote such standing. In majority Catholic societies, church officials claimed responsibility for religious education in state schools or state funding for independent Catholic schools and wielded significant influence over family law and censorship policies. State officials in these majority Catholic countries did not disturb existing synagogues or churches or monitor private religious conduct, but public religious witness—certainly proselytizing—by Protestants was discouraged and, at times, as in Spain and Italy, made subject to fines and imprisonment.

Even in the early 1900s, Spanish Jesuits had protested when American occupiers of the Philippines had written guarantees of religious freedom into the territory’s new constitution. As they explained:

But if by liberty of religions is understood the granting to all religions—for example the worship of Confucius, or of Mohammed—and to all the Protestant sects equal rights to open schools, erect churches, create parishes, have processions and public ceremonies, with the Catholic Church, we believe that it would not only not be advisable, but it would be a lamentable measure for any government which may rule the destinies of the Filipinos.³⁰

A generation later, many Catholics were even more certain. Poland’s first constitution in 1921 did not, technically, endorse Catholicism, but still declared that “the Catholic confession as the religion of the overwhelming majority of the people takes first place among all equal confessions.”³¹ During the drafting process for the new Irish constitution in the 1930s, Irish Jesuits urged Prime Minister Eamon de Valera to recognize the “special position” of Catholicism as in “other Catholic constitutions.”³² The final text identified Catholicism as the “faith of the great majority of the citizens,” but de Valera, sensitive to the plight of Catholics in the Protestant North and Dublin’s tiny Jewish community, declined to declare Catholicism the state church. Cardinal Pacelli [p. 164] acknowledged the difficulty but regretted the phrasing. He thought it would be preferable to formally endorse Catholicism and then acknowledge that the constitution “tolerates” other faiths.³³

III

CURIAL OFFICIALS triumphantly promulgated the first modern code of canon law in 1917, a bulky Latin volume that listed regulations on a bewildering array of topics, including the crucial insistence in Canon 329 that all episcopal appointments be made by the pope. (Saying so did not make it so. Governments in countries such as Spain played a role in the selection of bishops into the 1960s.) The language in Canon 218 registered ultramontane triumph: it claimed papal authority for not only “faith and morals” but anything “affect[ing] the discipline and government of the Church spread throughout the whole world.”³⁴

Bishops founded national conferences in the United States and a few other countries in the 1920s, but Vatican officials limited their influence. Boston’s archbishop, William O’Connell, trained in Rome, complained of episcopal colleagues in the United States taking a “plebiscite among the bishops” in order to “diminish the authority of the Roman congregations.”³⁵ Other bishops—even those highly placed within the Vatican itself—despaired at the unwillingness of curial officials to adapt their working patterns to the expanding needs of a global church and complained that important slots invariably went to well-connected Italians.³⁶

The same Roman focus on autonomy scuttled participation in interreligious or ecumenical initiatives. Presbyterians, Anglicans, and Methodists, especially, developed ties with each other and with Orthodox Christians in the early twentieth century. Some Catholics, led by Belgium’s Cardinal Désiré Mercier, participated in some of these discussions, but Benedict XV and his aides disliked the fact that Cardinal Mercier cheerfully referred to Protestants as “brothers and sisters in Christ.” Roman officials warned Mercier, who ignored them, against dialogue with “pseudo-bishops.”³⁷

Pius XI thought such ecumenical efforts reeked of “dogmatic liberalism and modernism.” He prohibited Catholic participation in ecumenical meetings in Switzerland and Germany, and in 1928 he issued an [p. 165] encyclical on religious unity, *Mortalium Animos*, that seemed less about unity than subjugation. Discussion of Christian cooperation could only proceed after recognition of the “authority and supremacy of Peter and his legitimate successor.”³⁸ Small groups of Protestants in Rome and across Italy, often led by Italians who had converted from Catholicism while working in the United States, occupied an inordinate amount of the pope’s attention, and he despaired at the Italian government’s unwillingness to enact repressive measures against these “heretics.”³⁹ While denouncing anti-Semitism, Pius XI also shut down a Catholic organization named Amici d’Israel (friends of Israel) out of fear that interreligious discussions, even about use of the phrase “perfidious Jews” in the Good Friday liturgy, might dilute doctrine.⁴⁰

On paper, church regulations prohibited Catholics from attending a funeral in a synagogue or Protestant church or even attending a secular university without permission from the local bishop. One English Catholic recalled his childhood in a tight-knit parish in London in the 1920s and early 1930s.

I was brought up not to enter a Protestant building, let alone take an active part in what took place there. Even to be present at the funeral or wedding of a non-Catholic relation required ecclesiastical permission and due care not to give the impression of taking part in the recitation of Protestant prayers or in hymn singing.⁴¹

IV

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF the church was also highlighted on the battlefields of World War I. Soldiers repeatedly wrote of their pride that Catholics were more regular than Protestants in attending battlefield church services. The Latin liturgy remained a common thread, with German Catholic soldiers on one side of the trenches in France and French and British Catholic soldiers on the other attending identical services. Marian shrines, such as Lourdes in France, Knock in Ireland, La Vang in Vietnam, and Altötting in Bavaria, drew record numbers of pilgrims. New Marian apparition sites attracted new pilgrims, most [p. 166] famously at Fatima in Portugal beginning in 1917, but also at Ezkioga in the Spanish Basque country and Beauraing in Belgium.

If conventional portraits of post-World War I European and North American elites stress disillusionment and alienation, Catholic intellectuals, perhaps even ordinary Catholics, thought history moved in their direction. As one Hungarian Jesuit explained, “Protestants ... sense very well, however much they may adhere to their confession, that Catholicism is the strongest fortress of the Christian faith and morality, the strongest bastion in the fight against liberal thought and destruction.”⁴²

The milieu was stronger than ever. The Netherlands contained not only Catholic schools, parishes, and universities in abundance, but also Catholic associations of laundry owners, tobacconists, barbers, and watchmakers.⁴³ When the Boy Scouts were introduced to the Netherlands as a potentially unifying youth movement, Catholic leaders created their own troops (as did Protestants) to avoid any taint of secularism.⁴⁴

A French priest and dean of the faculty at the Institut Catholique de Paris equated the Allied victory in the war with a new opportunity for neo-Thomism and the defeat of “German philosophy.”⁴⁵ Neo-Thomism [p. 167] remained the underpinning for intellectual work within the Catholic world, and journals and institutes in that tradition continued to proliferate. (Many of the scholarly articles were still published in Latin.) This shared intellectual universe did not prevent rival Thomisms, but it did facilitate a genuinely international Catholic scholarly community. By 1939, alumni from the Gregorian University in Rome, a center of neo-Thomism, worked in twenty-eight nations.⁴⁶



1932 Eucharistic Congress, Dublin. (#2473 courtesy of Fr. Browne SJ collection)

Eucharistic congresses, gatherings of Catholics from around the world for several days of Masses, processions, and exhortations, reached an extraordinary scale. Crowds of between five hundred thousand and over one million people attended the closing liturgies in Chicago (1926), Sydney (1928), Dublin (1932), Buenos Aires (1934), Manila (1936), and Budapest (1937). In Chicago, 150,000 people swarmed the train station to greet a special train of bright red coaches, dubbed the “Cardinals’ Special,” carrying several cardinals. In Buenos Aires, one priest recalled the scene:

We had calculated badly. We did not believe many men would come.... As it turned out, it was impossible. Nobody could move a step in any direction. The nuns made hosts the whole afternoon, and continued the whole night. In the Cathedral, Mass was said continually without interruptions, until past dawn. The priests brought the chalices on the Avenida de Mayo underground train. I heard confessions the whole night through, on the steps of the Loria station.⁴⁷

A single Catholic parish in the town of Timaru, on New Zealand’s South Island, counted only 2,350 registered souls but almost two dozen active organizations, from prayer groups to choirs to a cricket club. Rates of religious intermarriage in New Zealand were higher than in Catholic Europe or South America—only half of Catholics married other Catholics—but the subculture served a matchmaking role. Edicts against dancing, once strictly enforced, were set aside in an effort to promote social opportunities. A tennis club was said to claim a “record of Catholic marriages of which any matrimonial agency would be envious.”⁴⁸



1934 Parish Mission in Ireland. (#3.62.6 courtesy of Fr. Browne SJ collection)

[p. 168] The primary mechanism for exerting influence on public life became Catholic Action, or, as proponents defined it, “the participation of the laity in the apostolate of the hierarchy.” Begun by Pius X, the concept became the centerpiece of the pontificate of Pius XI, who dedicated a 1926 encyclical to the idea of “the Christian restoration of society in a Catholic sense.”⁴⁹ Priests founded organizations for youth, women, university students, and farmers. Catholic Action was most successful in northern Europe, especially the Low Countries and France, but also vital in Canada, Italy, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil. Significant Catholic Action groups emerged in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Uganda, and the Belgian Congo.

Military imagery suffused the movement—Belgians saw themselves as “a phalanx of the church of Christ”—with copious references to “knights” or “militia.”⁵⁰ Huge gatherings in Rome of youth groups, women, or workers became routine, culminating in audiences with Pius XI.

The precise goals of Catholic Action remained hazy, and local circumstances dictated particular programs. Some of the most innovative work occurred in Catholic-affiliated unions. These unions enrolled [p. 169] only one-seventh as many workers as Europe’s secular trade unions, but even in those secular unions Catholics became a key constituency. In Belgium, a young priest named Joseph Cardijn developed an influential methodology—See, Judge, Act—that allowed workers and young people to discuss their own solutions to the problems they encountered instead of simply listening to parents or chaplains. Cardijn explicitly saw himself competing with socialists for the allegiance of workers, and his work inspired other trade union activists across Europe.⁵¹

The ambitions of the JOC—after the French language abbreviation for Young Christian Workers—were immense. The slogan at one French national meeting was “Before we can convert Christians in the workshops, we must make the workshop Christian.”⁵² In front of eighty thousand Young Christian Workers in Paris in 1937, as the high point of a three-day festival of choral performances, meetings, and speeches, young workers carried a forty-foot-tall cross as a choir sang “Who builds the City?” and the crowd answered, “It is He.”⁵³

Running parallel to Catholic Action organization efforts were a new group of Catholic journals, including *Hochland* in Germany, *Criterio* in Argentina, *A Ordem* in Brazil, and *Commonweal* in the United States, typically founded by laypeople. No particular program united them beyond an uneasiness with secular liberalism and a desire, in the words of *Criterio*’s editors, to “prepare the Catholic conscience.”⁵⁴

V

WRITING FROM BERLIN in 1919, a city that in the span of a year witnessed the end of World War I, the collapse of the German Empire, a communist uprising, and the adoption of the democratic Weimar constitution, the influential German Jesuit Heinrich Pesch made a blunt assertion. “Capitalism has played itself out,” he told his readers. “It is irretrievably lost.... We agree with Marxian socialism that the future no longer belongs to the economic license of individualistic capitalism.”⁵⁵

Catholics in the interwar era still understood political economy as indispensable for their social vision. Authority and justice remained its key words, not democracy or civil liberties. But in the 1920s, as opposed to the 1890s, Pesch’s recipe of organized vocational groups, [p. 170] state intervention, and a limited free market seemed an ever more plausible “third way.”

The same postwar moment offered the same possibilities elsewhere. In the United States, the Washington priest John Ryan drafted a plan for postwar reconstruction issued under the name of the American bishops, where they endorsed old-age and unemployment insurance, labor participation in management, a minimum wage, and a form of national health care. Workers and managers, the bishops recommended, should learn “the folly of excessive selfishness and senseless individualism.” Higher taxes had the salutary effect of forcing a “small class of privileged capitalists ... to return a part of their unearned gains to society.”⁵⁶ A commentator for the liberal journal *The Nation* speculated that, as in Germany, secular reformers and Catholics might establish a new “kinship.”⁵⁷

An agricultural version of Catholic corporatism emerged, beginning in Belgium and spreading to Germany, Italy, and Mexico. In Calabria, Catholics began rural banks in order to “gradually acquire the consciousness of that solidarity which is their state.”⁵⁸ Bavarian Catholics brought the idea of rural cooperatives and lending societies to South Africa.⁵⁹ In the United States, Catholic agricultural cooperatives sprouted in the rural Midwest.⁶⁰

The most influential agricultural experiments occurred in Nova Scotia, where priest-professors from St. Francis Xavier University worked with farmers to set up marketing and production cooperatives, local stores, and insurance plans.⁶¹ Thousands of visitors from around the Catholic world journeyed to Nova Scotia to learn the techniques of the Nova Scotia, or Antigonish, system of cooperatives. They adapted them for use in Jamaica, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Peru as a mechanism for lessening the dependence of farmers on a particular harvest. (In the 1950s they expanded with great success to South Korea and what became Bangladesh.)⁶²

The release of Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* in May 1931 further energized Catholic corporatists. Drafted by two German Jesuits, Oswald von Nell-Breuning and Gustav Gundlach, its title marked forty years since Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum*. Nell-Breuning and Gundlach were part of an activist circle meeting at Königswinter, on the Rhine, [p. 171] and eager to integrate theology and the social sciences. Both men published widely on a German economy marked by hyperinflation during the 1920s and then, after the 1929 stock market crash, high unemployment. They stressed the "completely unhealthy" reliance on the free market to solve the inequities generated by a capitalist economy.⁶³

Published at the height of a global depression, *Quadragesimo Anno* was more radical than *Rerum Novarum*. Where *Rerum Novarum* stressed the rights of property owners, *Quadragesimo Anno* emphasized the "social character of ownership," and some neo-Thomists went further and dismissed conventional defenses of private property as "bourgeois." Where Leo XIII recommended workers' associations, Pius XI insisted that workers and employers jointly direct particular industries. The fact that the publication of *Quadragesimo Anno* coincided with the collapse of the Credit-Anstalt bank in Vienna and a subsequent run on banks across central Europe gave its recommendations even more punch.⁶⁴

This papal notion of a more harmonious and less competitive economy always had a utopian flavor. When he first read a draft of *Quadragesimo Anno*, the Father General of the Jesuits asked Nell-Breuning, "How long do you think it will take to achieve this?" Nell-Breuning sheepishly replied, "It will never be achieved."⁶⁵ Still, the desire for experimentation strengthened as the economic crisis deepened. In Poland, Catholic activists supported the creation of strong workers' councils, aid to small businesses, and checks on a consumer economy based on the "artificial creation of unwholesome needs."⁶⁶ Vietnamese Catholics who had studied in Paris worked with French missionaries to bring Catholic Action ideas back to Southeast Asia. They sponsored numerous conferences and meetings on such topics as "Christian Social Doctrine and the Question of Work."⁶⁷

Even in the United States, before the 1932 election, Democratic presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt sent a giddy tremor through Catholic circles by quoting *Quadragesimo Anno* on the campaign trail. The encyclical, Roosevelt explained, was "just as radical as I am" and "one of the greatest documents of modern times."⁶⁸ The cornerstone program of Roosevelt's first term, the National Recovery Administration, with its attempt to set wages

and prices, confirmed the Catholic view that planning, not economic growth, was the way forward. One [p. 172] writer viewed Roosevelt as moving toward “the Solidarism advocated by Father [Heinrich] Pesch ... over forty years ago.”⁶⁹

VI

THE ZENTRUM PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVE, Helene Weber, one of the few women elected to the committee to draft Germany’s democratic constitution in 1919, knew the task ahead would be challenging. Born in 1881, Weber began her professional career as a history instructor at an elite high school for women, where she was later remembered for her rigorous standards and the large briefcase of maps and graded essays she deposited on her desk before querying students on the day’s lesson. She managed to attend university while teaching and eventually became the head of the *Katholischen Frauenbunde*, or Catholic Women’s League.⁷⁰

Weber merged an interest in economic reforms along the lines of *Rerum Novarum* (1891) with an equally distinctive vision of the family. For Weber, as for many socially minded Catholics, the widespread Catholic demand for a living wage for male workers doubled as a defense of traditional familial arrangements, since it was imperative, as Weber explained, that after having a child “a woman’s job has to take the backseat and the family has to become the new center of her life.”⁷¹ Fathers exhausted from overwork and mothers forced to labor outside the home could not devote proper attention to raising their children. The Irish Constitution of 1937 insisted that private property be “regulated by the principles of social justice,” but also regretted that some women felt economic pressure to take on paid labor “to the neglect of their duties inside the home.”⁷²

Laywomen such as Weber enrolled hundreds of thousands of members in Catholic women’s organizations across Europe and North and South America. Instead of a false equality, in the words of one French activist, these women believed that the family was the “essential context for the woman question.”⁷³ The Catholic women’s movement in Italy only hesitantly took the name *movimento femminile cristiano* because of negative connotations around the term “feminist,” which had come into use in the nineteenth century and gained ground in the twentieth.⁷⁴ [p. 173] For women forced by circumstance to accept low-wage jobs, protective legislation limiting hours worked in a day seemed imperative, since, as one Chilean Catholic woman explained, “weakness is the origin of civil and social rights.”⁷⁵

Education for women was important, and nuns such as the Madames of the Sacred Heart and the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur, based in northern Europe but with establishments all over the world, founded colleges or high schools for women. Thirty different congregations of women religious in Philadelphia ran three colleges, seventeen private academies, over two hundred elementary schools, eight hospitals, thirteen orphan asylums, eleven day nurseries, one settlement house, seven old-age homes, three homes for the handicapped, eight boarding houses for women, five homes for “unfortunate” women, and three visiting nurse associations.⁷⁶ In the Global South, the autonomy offered

to women in religious orders meant a break with prevailing patriarchal customs. The decision of Bernadette Garatsa in Rhodesia to join a convent infuriated her father, leading to a lawsuit and Garatsa's eventual triumph in British colonial courts, affirming the right of an adult African woman to make life choices independent of paternal desires.⁷⁷

Helene Weber focused on laywomen as leaders in the newly emerging profession of social work, where she encouraged Catholics to adopt modern methods. Her work paralleled that of Jane Addams in the United States, and Weber visited Addams in Chicago to exchange ideas. She and her Catholic peers nonetheless still viewed even social work through the lens of protecting the nuclear family. When drafting the Weimar constitution and through her service as an elected Center Party representative in the Reichstag, Weber fought against divorce law reform, which she and other Catholics viewed as less a tool to liberate women from oppressive marriages and more a vehicle to enable dissolute men. In Brazil, similarly, Catholic women led a petition drive against divorce well before they received the vote.⁷⁸ In Italy, Catholic women collected 3.5 million signatures in opposition to the reform of divorce laws.⁷⁹

Around the world, male Catholic leaders (and some women) were initially equivocal on the topic of women's suffrage. Pius X allegedly told a German Catholic woman that he "approved of a cultured woman, [p. 174] one who knew Latin, even a woman doctor, but not a female voter."⁸⁰ Some German Catholic women insisted as late as 1918 that what they desired "is not the right to vote, but rather the possibility to become true housewives and mothers."⁸¹

Weber persuaded her colleagues in the Center Party to shift direction and support women's suffrage in the 1919 constitution, ignoring insinuations that she was an overly modern "Berliner." (She confided to a friend that some party members considered her "most unpleasant" for her advocacy of women's suffrage.)⁸² Eventually, male Zentrum party leaders came around, partly as a matter of principle and partly as a competitive strategy. Catholics knew that many secular male liberals in France, Mexico, and elsewhere opposed women's suffrage precisely because they feared voting rights for women would enhance the power of Catholic parties. In France, liberals and socialists worried about a "government of priests" and a "Catholic mentality" shared by potential women voters. Women won the right to vote in France only in 1946.⁸³

And in fact, Catholic women did support Catholic political parties and causes more consistently than Catholic men. In Germany, Catholic women were the most loyal Zentrum voters in the 1920s. Uruguayan women stressed that "the Communist woman, the Socialist woman" would exercise the ballot, and so Catholic women must "with the same firmness." Ecuador, the first country in Latin America to enfranchise women in 1929, also had the highest percentage of Catholics in its governing structure.⁸⁴

A few Catholic activists debated whether they should emphasize elevating men's wages (even basing wages on the number of children in a family) or raise women's wages to equal men's. Most thought the answer obvious: focus on male heads of households and

families. In France, Catholics rallied around the idea of allowances—*allocations familiales*—for married women raising children.⁸⁵ One woman laborer in Argentina, a leader in a Christian union, explained:

I spend eight hours every day of the week in a factory. Nevertheless I tell you: *women should not have to work*.... God did not create her to supplement her husband's meager salary, but to be a companion, a girlfriend, a wife and [p. 175] a mother. That's why we women are in the JOC. Because the JOC understands our vocation and our destiny, and will always struggle, unto death, to restore to women their lost Christian dignity.⁸⁶

By the 1930s, though, some married Catholic women expressed a desire to work outside the home because of the meaning they derived from such work. Left-leaning French Catholics disparaged ideas of the “eternal feminine” and demanded equal pay for equal work. An Austrian woman urged clergy and politicians to recognize that “a woman's value is not determined merely by the calling to marriage and motherhood, but rather to other professions as well.”⁸⁷

VII

THE WEAKENING OF Victorian-era reticence on sexual and cultural matters marked the interwar period on both sides of the Atlantic. Writers and artists challenged obscenity laws, and public health officials advocated for the regulation of prostitution. Newly confident Catholics immersed themselves in these debates over censorship and sexuality, what Helene Weber termed protecting “public morality.”⁸⁸ Irish bishops lamented the prevalence of the “dance hall, the bad book, the indecent paper, the motion picture and the immodest fashion in female dress.”⁸⁹ Roman officials joined bishops and lay Catholic intellectuals (male and female) in Lithuania, the United States, France, and Ireland in regretting fashion trends that raised hemlines above the knee or encouraged the use of lipstick.⁹⁰

Monitoring the production of books and newspapers was challenging given the decentralized publishing industry, although Weber and other Catholics bemoaned the “rising tide of filthy and dirty magazines.”⁹¹ Film, the era's most popular cultural form, offered more possibilities. In the Catholic view, movies promoted immorality if they depicted premarital (or extramarital) sex, divorce, or contempt for religious institutions. This assessment was not unique to Catholics, but only Catholics had the organizational capacity to do something about it. The International Union of Catholic Women's Leagues and priests involved with [p. 176] Catholic Action programs worked to foster “good” cinema, and some of its members, as in Holland, sat on national boards of film censorship.⁹²

Belgium became the home of the International Catholic Organization of Cinema, which encouraged Catholics not only to evaluate but to produce their own films. A Belgian Dominican priest saw the heightened influence of the media as requiring “nothing less than a total spiritual mobilization.”⁹³ But the size of the American film industry meant that more could be accomplished in Los Angeles than in Brussels. Catholic bishops authorized the formation of the Legion of Decency in 1934 and encouraged millions of Catholics to

take the Decency Pledge against attending objectionable movies. (Philadelphia's Cardinal Dougherty briefly forbade local Catholics from attending *any* films.)

Catholic pressure on the box office—or threats of such pressure—pushed studio executives to the bargaining table. An American Jesuit, Daniel Lord, devised guidelines for review and censorship of Hollywood films. Fr. Lord's use of natural law terminology—"the law which is written in the hearts of all mankind"—suggested his theological training. So, too, did his refusal to approve cinematic treatments of abortion, venereal disease, homosexuality, and birth control.⁹⁴ Parallel organizations emerged in Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Argentina, and Germany, essentially wherever Catholics possessed sufficient cultural influence to insert themselves into the censorship process. In Mexico, Catholic-dominated boards monitored new films, often to combat Hollywood stereotypes of salacious Latin American women or decadent Latin American men.⁹⁵ As late as the 1950s, Italian Catholic Action groups owned and ran over four thousand movie theaters, showing only Church-approved films.⁹⁶

Censorship questions were controversial, but the most divisive topic—central to the entire twentieth-century history of Catholicism—was contraception. Most religious leaders in most religious traditions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thought contraception immoral. A distinctive Catholic campaign against contraception emerged only haltingly, scaling the hurdles of public reticence about sexual matters and widespread confusion among even physicians about the biological facts of a woman's reproductive cycle. As contraceptive practices and devices became more widespread, Catholic leaders overcame their hesitation. Sexual intercourse, Catholic philosophers [p. 177] explained, like freedom itself, had particular ends. And the primary end of intercourse remained procreation. Attempts to interfere with this end through contraception violated the natural law.

This interlocking set of assumptions fueled Catholic activism, but so, too, did the practice of confession. Protestant and Jewish leaders might oppose contraception, but such discussions, always intermittent, had an ethereal air. For Catholics, by contrast, contraception posed acute problems, since many Catholic adults attended confession monthly, or even weekly, and since all Catholics were formally required to attend confession after having committed serious sins.

Public awareness of Catholic opposition to contraception became widespread after 1921, when New York police broke up a public meeting of the American Birth Control Conference. Allegations that the police acted at the behest of New York's Cardinal Patrick Hayes remained unproven, although plausible. Hayes took the occasion to issue a pastoral letter, read out loud at each Sunday Mass in Manhattan, concluding that "Children troop down from Heaven because God wills it.... Woe to those who degrade, pervert, or do violence to the law of nature as fixed by the eternal decree of God Himself!"

Quick to define the contest as Catholics versus the enlightened, New York's Margaret Sanger, the world's most prominent advocate of contraception, immediately informed

readers of the *Birth Control Review* that “you can no longer remain neutral. You must make a declaration of independence, of self-reliance, or submit to the dictatorship of the Roman Catholic hierarchy.”

Into the 1930s, few public officials risked Catholic wrath by supporting or sponsoring legislation on birth control. In Britain and New Zealand, Catholic opposition intimidated the efforts of Labour Party activists to loosen restrictions on access to birth control. In Germany, Catholics in the Center Party such as Helene Weber agreed with many economic policies of the Social Democrats, but disagreed with plans to increase access to birth control. When American Catholics complained to President Franklin Roosevelt about federal workers promoting the use of birth control in an impoverished, predominantly Catholic Puerto Rico, Roosevelt immediately replied that his administration would refrain from “teaching Birth Control.”⁹⁷ With [p. 178] Vatican encouragement, Catholic diplomats from a number of countries strategized to prevent the League of Nations from promoting contraception.⁹⁸

Frank discussion of birth control troubled Roman theologians. As early as 1925, cardinals assembled in Rome discussed a report from the apostolic delegate to the United States who worried that the “plague” of birth control was infecting American Catholics. Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli expressed the same fears about German Catholics.⁹⁹

The first shift occurred among Anglicans, whose bishops in 1930 voted to permit married couples to use contraceptives for “a morally sound reason.” In response, two Jesuits based in Rome—one Belgian and one German—drafted the first formal papal statement on contraception, the encyclical *Casti Connubii*, which consolidated Catholic teaching in the strongest terms. Procreation remained the final and most important end of sexual intercourse. No reason, “however grave,” justified use of contraceptives, an act “intrinsically against nature.” Released within four months of each other, each written in a prophetic, uncompromising tone, *Casti Connubii* and *Quadragesimo Anno* stretched Catholic teaching to its severest limits. Each document, the one on marriage and the other on the economy, called for wages to match family needs. In Washington, John Ryan, predictably, highlighted the passage in *Casti Connubii* that urged government officials to “do their utmost to relieve the needs of the poor.”¹⁰⁰

Casti Connubii was publicly greeted by Catholics around the world with great enthusiasm, but denouncing contraception at the height of a global depression did not suggest an overreliance on focus groups.¹⁰¹ During the 1930s, anxious Catholic couples either abstained from sex or used contraceptives at higher rates. One knowledgeable priest in the United States privately admitted that “practically every priest who is close to the people admits that contraception is the hardest problem of the confessional today.”¹⁰²

Limits to the liberal faith in individual autonomy also became evident. In the early twentieth century, progressive reformers around the world became convinced that governments needed to pass laws requiring the sterilization of “imbeciles” and criminals. Sanger herself regretted that “anybody in this vast country is at perfect liberty to become

a father or [p. 179] a mother”—including a “mental defective,” a “pauper,” and those bereft of “common decency.”¹⁰³ Her British counterpart, Marie Stopes, explicitly worried about too many Catholic children, or, as she delicately put it, “soiled, diseased, desperate, and misbegotten reproductions.”¹⁰⁴

Catholics occasionally used eugenic language themselves. In New Zealand, Auckland’s bishop worried that “the prolific Oriental” would reproduce in great numbers while Catholic women of European descent refused to bear the children God desired.¹⁰⁵ The most prominent German Catholic eugenicist, Fr. Hermann Muckermann, explained his “first concern” as preserving “the untouched, hereditary, elemental nature of the German people.”¹⁰⁶

Still, most Catholic intellectuals—even in Germany—could not reconcile forced sterilization and eugenics with *Casti Connubii*. Nazi officials fired Fr. Muckermann from his directorship at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology because of his scruples about ambitious National Socialist programs of racial hygiene. Milan’s Fr. Agostino Gemelli found himself repeatedly forced to explain to Italian eugenicists why he could not endorse the “moral error” of sterilization.¹⁰⁷ The most distinguished Catholic anthropologist in the United States eventually withdrew from contact with the nation’s leading eugenic organizations because of their obsession with so-called Nordic races.¹⁰⁸

In Britain, Poland, France, Quebec, and Latin America, Catholics, and usually only Catholics, challenged reformers wielding the authority of science in order to limit the reproductive capacities of the “unfit.” No institution did more. The archbishop of New Orleans scorned the notion of a “millenium of supermen and superwomen as perfect specimens of the human animal, bred and reared according to the latest eugenic rules.” Instead of forced sterilizations, he suggested, the state might guarantee that the poor were “properly housed and protected against the profiteer.”¹⁰⁹

VIII

THE CATHOLIC IDEA of a rightly ordered society extended beyond economics and the family to politics. After World War I, two patterns became evident. In Anglophone countries, Catholics eagerly partici [p. 180] pated in local and national politics and self-consciously acknowledged a democratic legacy stretching back to Ireland’s Daniel O’Connell. One child of Irish Catholic migrants, Al Smith, ran for president as the first Catholic nominee of a major political party in the United States in 1928. Another child of Irish Catholic migrants, James Scullin, was elected prime minister of Australia in 1929.

In Italy and Germany, too, Catholic democrats became more visible. In 1919, Benedict XV welcomed the formation of the first Catholic Italian political party, the Partito Popolare Italiano, or PPI, led by a charismatic Sicilian priest, Fr. Luigi Sturzo. Sturzo’s passion for Catholic involvement in political life had already extended to serving in his native town’s city government and founding its most important local newspaper. The PPI was an immediate electoral success, claiming 20 percent of the national vote in the first postwar

elections and sending one hundred representatives to parliament. A few German Catholics, notably the convert Erik Peterson, in an essay dedicated to Sturzo, hoped that Catholics could underwrite “a harmonious welfare democracy with special regard for the weak classes.”¹¹⁰

An equally important pattern, though, was for Catholic intellectuals and politicians to express doubts about democracy’s future, especially as assassinations, chaotic parliamentary debates, and rotating chief executives destabilized democratic governments. Of the twenty-eight European parliamentary democracies in 1920, thirteen had become authoritarian governments by 1938. Democracies weakened or collapsed in South America’s largest countries, including Brazil and Argentina.

Catholics stood at the center of this maelstrom. Democracy was the dog that rarely barked in Catholic social thought, and papal commentary evaded the term. Voluminous commentaries on workers’ rights and just wages contrasted with terse examinations of politics. Catholics might found political parties and run for office, but Catholic theory lagged Catholic practice. In Europe, a surprising number of priests became presidents, prime ministers, and leading parliamentary figures, including Ignaz von Seipel in Austria, Willem Nolens in Holland, Josef Tiso in Slovakia, Ottokár Procházka in Hungary, and Ludwig Kaas in Germany. Despite their electoral successes, these men often displayed a contempt for parliamentary wrangling. This antidemocratic sensibility [p. 181] stemmed in part from the tendency of democratic governments to abolish or harass Catholic schools or expropriate Catholic property; in part it derived from neo-Thomism, with its emphasis on order and authority.

Democracy received little support in Rome. Pius XI, in his first encyclical, offered a condescending appraisal of “modern democratic states,” which were “most exposed to the danger of being overthrown by one faction or another.”¹¹¹ Vatican officials kept Fr. Sturzo’s PPI at arm’s length and eventually decided it was better to negotiate directly with Benito Mussolini after he seized power in 1922. Fearful of assassination by Mussolini’s agents, Sturzo fled to London and then the United States.

One of the Nazi movement’s opponents in Munich in the 1920s was Cardinal Michael Faulhaber, but Faulhaber viewed democratic politics with almost equal disdain. Dismayed by the absence of any recognition of God in the Weimar constitution, Faulhaber advocated for monarchy over republican institutions in a famous 1922 debate with Konrad Adenauer, later the first chancellor of West Germany but then a young Catholic mayor of Cologne and a defender of the Weimar government. Both men left the podium “with bright red faces.”¹¹²

From his nuncio’s office in Munich, Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli watched the growth of the Nazi Party with foreboding, especially since the movement at its origins counted many Catholic members eager to demonstrate their patriotic bonafides. Hitler’s own anti-Catholic rhetoric soon soured many of these Catholics, notably his attacks in *Mein Kampf* on “ultramontanism” and the futility of an international church attempting to

represent the “feelings of the German people.”¹¹³ Still, Pacelli privately speculated that nationalism might be the “most dangerous heresy of our time.”¹¹⁴

The most important nationalist and authoritarian voice within the Catholic milieu was France’s Charles Maurras, an unbeliever but also a royalist, an anti-Semite, and a nationalist dismayed by France’s evolution toward secular democracy. The movement Maurras founded, *Action Française*, began during the turmoil of the Dreyfus affair in the 1890s, but his blend of nationalism and authoritarianism gained an international audience in the 1920s. One French Catholic recalled, with some hyperbole, the extent of Maurras’s influence:

[p. 182] [The *Action Française* exerted] an almost complete dictatorship over Catholic intellectual circles. Whoever came out as a democrat in those circles was doomed to be an object of an ironical and scornful pity; he was looked down upon as a person behind the times, a survivor of another age.¹¹⁵

Outside of France, Catholics in French Canada, Italy, Spain, and South America shared with Maurras a disdain for “Anglo-Saxon” values and the unrestrained capitalism they associated with the United States.¹¹⁶ An important Brazilian Catholic intellectual recalled Maurras’s appeal this way: “We found that the religious movement of this era should parallel the political movement, against liberal democracy.”¹¹⁷

Startled by Maurras and like-minded figures, Pius XI tried to redirect Catholics away from a toxic mixture of political authoritarianism and nationalism. He placed Maurras’s writings on the Index of Forbidden Books and then in 1926 condemned the *Action Française*. He made a French cardinal unwilling to disavow Maurras resign his position, the first resignation of a cardinal in the modern era.

In the moment these papal hesitations about nationalism had only modest effect. Maurras’s allies publicly pledged obedience to the pope while privately assuring each other that history would vindicate them. The class notes of a student at a Roman seminary directed by supporters of Maurras reveal a professor describing France as possessing “two souls.” One soul was Catholic and opposed to the French Revolution. The other was a blend of “Masonry, Judaism and Protestantism.”¹¹⁸ “Despite the Pope, the Cardinal, the Nuncio and the rest,” another Maurras supporter noted, “everybody here is in excellent form. This will pass. The *Action Française* is like the Church itself. Persecutions do it good.”¹¹⁹

Still, a few Catholics began to register their concern. The era’s most important scholar of nationalism, Columbia University’s Carlton Hayes, a Catholic convert, explicitly attacked Maurras, Mussolini, and Hitler.¹²⁰ French Jesuit Henri de Lubac, destined to become one of the most influential theologians at the Second Vatican Council, tried to distinguish in his first published essay between an honorable patriotism and [p. 183] a destructive nationalism. He worried that Catholicism might become “an instrument of service to nationalist passions.”¹²¹

IX

IN 1924 PLUTARCO CALLES, a determined anticlerical, was elected president of Mexico. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 had already formally banned religious instruction in all primary schools, prohibited monastic orders, banned public religious processions, and required priests to obtain government licenses while prohibiting them from voting or wearing clerical garb in public. But these laws were loosely enforced and a new group of Catholic organizations emerged to defend church interests.

Calles's election upset this equilibrium. Calles and his aides vowed to implement the provisions of the 1917 constitution and to make schools entirely secular, with the vocal support of American liberals such as the philosopher John Dewey. Dewey bluntly explained that "the Church can hardly escape paying the penalty for the continued ignorance and lack of initiative which it has tolerated if not cultivated."¹²²

In response, prodded by Catholic Action organizations, Mexico's bishops declared a suspension of all Masses on August 1, 1926. Almost immediately, a civil war exploded between government forces and Catholic dissidents centered in the states of Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Jalisco. Perhaps fifty thousand Catholics took up arms against the government, calling themselves Cristeros after the idea promoted by Pius XI of a Christ the King standing above politics.

The welcome given to Calles's anticlerical initiatives differed from town to town. In one Michoacán village, educators and military officials described Catholic clergy as "deeply fanatical" and rallied villagers to force the local bishop into exile. In another Michoacán village, only federal troops could restore order after protesting crowds shouted "¡Viva Cristo Rey!" ("Long live Christ the King.")¹²³

Twenty-five hundred Mexican bishops, priests, nuns, and lay leaders fled to the United States, making San Antonio, Texas, the hub of the resistance. (The Mexican Episcopal Committee met there for the duration of the war.) The Calles government deported other Catholics and used secret agents to monitor their activities. Both exiles and deportees encouraged anti-government sentiment and rallied Catholics around the world to the cause of religious liberty in Mexico. The Knights of Columbus, a US-based Catholic fraternal organization with many Mexican branches, organized meetings and raised funds for the Cristeros. The rebels seemed, in the words of a government informer, to have "plenty of sympathizers who are helping out with money and ammunition."¹²⁴

The saga of one Mexican Jesuit, Miguel Pro, attracted much attention. Pro had studied in Mexico, Nicaragua, France, and Belgium. Upon his return to Mexico, he became active in the resistance to the Calles government by celebrating clandestine Masses and personally escorting groups of nuns across the Mexican-American border into Texas under cover of darkness.¹²⁵ After an acquaintance plotted the assassination of Calles, Pro and his brother were arrested and convicted without a trial, although it seems unlikely they knew anything of the conspiracy. A photo of Pro before his execution, kneeling, with a crucifix around his neck and a rosary in his hand, and uttering the words "¡Viva Cristo Rey!"

became a talisman of Catholic resistance to a secular state. Believers exchanged it as a postcard. A French Canadian Jesuit who had met the young Pro in Europe wrote a biography that was immediately translated into multiple languages.¹²⁶



Postcard of Mexican Jesuit Miguel Pro before his execution in 1927. (*Courtesy of Rare Books and Special Collections, Hesburgh Library, University of Notre Dame*)

[p. 185] Events in Mexico seemed to augur a new, more aggressive secularist agenda. When Poland's ambassador to the Vatican met with Pius XI, they discussed the Cristero Rebellion. The pope "asserted that when it comes to the Catholic countries, such as Poland, France, Spain, and South America, activities from Masonry on the one hand and communists on the other might lead to a total collapse of authority."¹²⁷

Vatican officials commended Mexican Catholics for their resistance to the "impious laws" and a "persecuting government." In private memos they compared events in Mexico with events during the French Revolution.¹²⁸ But they, too, desired to end the war. After three years and ninety thousand deaths, Catholic leaders from the United States helped bring the Cristeros and the Calles government to the bargaining table. Leaders from both sides negotiated a cease-fire in 1929.

X

VINCENT LEBBE AND MA XIAOBANG continued to struggle for an authentically Chinese Catholicism. Lebbe counted as a friend the influential Belgian Jesuit and Louvain professor, Pierre Charles, who taught generations of future missionaries that their role was to plant Indigenous churches, not simply import an ultramontane European Catholicism. Charles invited Lebbe to speak at Louvain on such topics as “indigenous clergy in China” and “China and the foreigner.”¹²⁹

Sympathy for the view that Catholics must become integrated into host societies became more and more evident in Rome. The Vatican’s Holy Office reversed course in 1936 and allowed Catholics to bow before the Yasukuni Shrine outside of Tokyo, a Shinto site dedicated to honoring Japanese war dead. Such gestures had once been forbidden—two students at Jesuit-run Sophia University had infuriated Japan’s fascist leaders by refusing to bow in 1932—but now became defined as registering “patriotism and loyalty,” not religious worship.¹³⁰ The Propaganda Fide revoked the 1704 papal condemnation of the Jesuit Chinese rites, a tacit admission that contemporary missionaries must acculturate to their surroundings in much the same way as the first Catholic missionaries to Asia. Missionaries who had once disparaged Confucius now described him as a sage.¹³¹

[p. 186] The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 energized Ma Xiaobang, and he addressed the national assembly on the necessity of a “moral rearmament.”¹³² In 1938, on his one hundredth birthday, Nationalist Party officials battling the Japanese took time to honor a feeble Ma with a celebration of his life and work, although he had been taken to Vietnam to escape Japanese bombing campaigns. He died unaware he had left his homeland.

Lebbe also threw himself into the struggle against the Japanese. His defense of the China he now called home—he became a citizen in 1933—included service in Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist army (with the honorary rank of colonel), organizing a Catholic regiment for this “most just of wars,” and volunteering his Little Brothers as stretcher bearers.¹³³ Chinese Catholics viewed Lebbe as a hero—in contrast to Italian Catholic missionaries willing to collaborate with the Japanese invaders—and lined up to confess their sins to him. Lebbe’s close friend, Bishop Yu Bin, urged Chinese Catholics to “take up arms, defend their country and if necessary die for her, with honor.”¹³⁴

Chinese communists arrested Lebbe when the alliance between Mao Zedong’s Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists broke down in the late 1930s. They imprisoned him for eighty days. Desperately ill upon his release, Lebbe was flown to the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing and welcomed as a hero. He died in June 1940. In one of his last letters, he vowed to continue demonstrating, “even if I am alone in the world, Christian indignation against the demon of imperialism.”¹³⁵

Notes to Chapter 7

Original chapter endnotes, with numbering preserved.

1 Li Tiangang, “Christianity and Cultural Conflict,” trans. Ruth Hayhoe, in *Ma Xiangbo and the Mind of Modern China 1840–1939*, eds. Ruth Hayhoe and Lu Yongling (Armonk, NY, 1996), 107–111.

2 Tiangang, “Christianity and Cultural Conflict,” 120.

3 Ma Xiangbo, “A Letter to the Pope Asking Him to Promote Education in China,” [1912], in *Ma Xiangbo and the Mind of Modern China*, 219–222.

4 Vincent Lebbe to Dom Bède, May 1, 1900, in *Lettres du Père Lebbe*, eds. Paul Goffart and Albert Sohier (Tournai 1960), 30.

5 Vincent Lebbe to Dom Bède, July 13, 1901, in *Lettres du Père Lebbe*, 39.

6 Vincent Lebbe to Antoine Cotta, Mar. 10, 1908, in *Lettres du Père Lebbe*, 80.

7 Maurice Cheza, “Le chanoine Joly inspirateur du Père Lebbe? Un moment du Débat sur la rénovation des méthodes missionnaires,” *Revue Théologique de Louvain* 14 (1983): 315.

8 Anthony E. Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and His Cathedral* (Seattle 2019), 66.

9 Ernest P. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China’s Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate* (New York 2013), 160, 178–179.

10 Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony*, 188.

11 Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony*, 178.

12 Vincent Lebbe to Bishop Reynaud, Sept. 18, 1917, in *Lettres du Père Lebbe*, 143.

13 Antoine Cotta to Vincent Lebbe, Mar. 3, 1920, in *Recueil Des Archives Vincent Lebbe: Pour L’Église Chinoise III. L’Encyclique Maximum Illud*, ed. Claude Soetens (Louvain 1983), 26.

14 Claude Soetens, “Introduction,” in *Recueil Des Archives Vincent Lebbe: Pour L’Église Chinoise III*, 19.

15 Vincent Lebbe quoted in 1925 talk, *Recueil Des Archives Vincent Lebbe: Un an d’activité du Père Lebbe: 1926*, ed. Claude Soetens (Louvain 1984), iii–v.

16 Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony*, 243; Arnulf Camps, “Celso Constantini, Apostolic Delegate in China, 1922–1933,” in Camps, *Studies in Asian Mission History* (Leiden 2000), 171; Thomas Coomans, “Indigenizing Catholic Architecture in China: From Western-Gothic to Sino-Christian Design 1900–1940,” in *Catholicism in China, 1900–Present: The Development of the Chinese Church*, ed. Cindy Yik-yi Chu (New York 2014), 132–136.

17 Vincent Lebbe to Bishop Reynaud, Sept. 18, 1917, in *Lettres du Père Lebbe*, 154.

18 Paul P. Mariani, S.J., “The First Six Chinese Bishops of Modern Times: A Study in Church Indigenization,” *Catholic Historical Review* 100 (2014): 486–513.

19 Vincent Lebbe to Antoine Cotta, Oct. 17, 1926, in *Recueil Des Archives Vincent Lebbe: Un an d’activité du Père Lebbe: 1926*, 229; Vincent Lebbe to Msgr. Braun, Oct. 31, 1926, in *Recueil Des Archives Vincent Lebbe: Un an d’activité du Père Lebbe: 1926*, 233.

20 Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony*, 243.

21 Helmut Walzer Smith, *Germany: A Nation in Its Time* (New York 2020), 299.

22 Patrick J. Houlihan, *Catholicism and the Great War: Religion and Everyday Life in Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1922* (Cambridge 2015), 62.

23 Andrzej Walicki, “The Troubling Legacy of Roman Dmowski,” *East European Politics and Societies* 14 (2000): 32.

- 24 Margaret Todaro Williams, "Pastors, Prophets and Politicians: A Study of the Brazilian Catholic Church, 1916-1945" (Columbia, PhD 1971), 427.
- 25 Thomas J. Morrissey, S.J., *From Easter Week to Flanders Field: The Diaries and Letters of John Delaney, S.J., 1916-1919* (Dublin 2015), 123.
- 26 Elizabeth A. Foster, *Faith in Empire: Religion, Politics, and Colonial Rule in French Senegal, 1880-1940* (Stanford 2013), 107.
- 27 Guiliana Chamedes, *A Twentieth-Century Crusade: The Vatican's Battle to Remake Christian Europe* (Cambridge 2019), 2.
- 28 Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Re-Imagining of Eastern Europe* (Stanford 2020), 98.
- 29 Chamedes, *A Twentieth-Century Crusade*, 34-68; *Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio* (1922), §45.
- 30 John T. McGreevy, *American Jesuits and the World: How an Embattled Religious Order Made Modern Catholicism Global* (Princeton 2016), 189.
- 31 Houlihan, *Catholicism and the Great War*, 64.
- 32 Séan Faughnan, "The Jesuits and the Drafting of the Irish Constitution of 1937," *Irish Historical Studies* 26 (1988): 8.
- 33 Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and the Vatican: The Politics and Diplomacy of Church-State Relations 1922-1960* (Cork 1995), 134-137.
- 34 Canon 329 and Canon 218 in *The 1917 or Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law*, ed. Edward N. Peters (San Francisco 2001), 132-133, 93-94.
- 35 Gerald Fogarty, "Cardinal William Henry O'Connell," in *Varieties of Ultramontanism*, ed. Jeffrey Von Arx (Washington 1998), 137.
- 36 Hans de Vlak, " 'Some Matters That Should Be Improved in the Government of the Church,' a Remarkable Proposal for the Reform of the Roman Curia, 1931," in *Suavis Laborum Memoria: Essays in Honour of Marcel Chappin, S.J., on His 70th Birthday*, eds. Paul Van Geest and Roberto Regoli (Vatican City 2013), 183-208.
- 37 J. Dessain, "Le progrès de l'oecumenisme: l'incident Mercier 1919-1922," *Revue Théologique de Louvain* 5 (1974): 469-476.
- 38 John Pollard, "The Unpublished Encyclicals of the Pontificate of Pope Pius XI: *De Ecclesia Christi*, 1931," *Cristianesimo nella storia* 38 (2017): 813-866.
- 39 Kevin Madigan, *The Popes against the Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy* (New Haven 2021).
- 40 Hubert Wolf, *Pope and Devil: The Vatican's Archives and the Third Reich*, trans. Kenneth Kronenberg (Cambridge 2010), 81-126.
- 41 Clifford Longley, *The Worlock Archive* (London 2000), 28.
- 42 Paul A. Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890-1944* (Ithaca 2006), 91.
- 43 John A. Coleman, *The Evolution of Dutch Catholicism, 1958-1974* (Berkeley 1978), 97.
- 44 Kristin Mennen and Marijn Molema, "The Role of Religion in the Dutch Scout Movement (1911-1973)," *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 111 (2016): 642.
- 45 Philippe Chenaux, "The 1920s Francophone Thomistic Revival," in *Neo-Thomism in Action: Law and Society Reshaped by Neo-Scholastic Philosophy 1880-1960*, eds. Wim Decock, Bart Raymaekers, and Peter Heyrman (Leuven 2022), 42.
- 46 Edward Baring, "Ideas on the Move: Context in Transnational Intellectual History," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 77 (2016): 574-583.
- 47 Austen Ivereigh, *Catholicism and Politics in Argentina: 1810-1960* (New York 1995), 76-77.

- 48 Christopher Van Der Krogt, "Catholic Religious Identity and Social Integration in Interwar New Zealand," *Catholic Historical Review* 86 (2000): 47–65.
- 49 John Pollard, "Pius XI's Promotion of the Italian Model of Catholic Action in the World-Wide Church," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 63 (2012): 758–784.
- 50 Martin Conway, "Building the Christian City: Catholics and Politics in Interwar Francophone Belgium," *Past and Present* 128 (1990): 122–125.
- 51 *Between Cross and Class: Comparative Histories of Christian Labour in Europe 1840–2000*, eds. Lex Heerma van Voss, Patrick Pasture, and Jan De Maeyer (Bern 2005).
- 52 Gerd Ranier-Horn, *Western European Liberation Theology: The First Wave (1924–1959)* (New York 2008), 26.
- 53 Philip Nord, "Catholic Culture in Interwar France," *French Politics, Culture and Society* 21 (2003): 7.
- 54 Ivereigh, *Catholicism and Politics in Argentina*, 75.
- 55 Franz H. Mueller, "I Knew Heinrich Pesch," *Social Order* 1 (1951): 147–148.
- 56 Program of Social Reconstruction, February 12, 1919, in *Pastoral Letters of the United States Catholic Bishops* (Washington 1984), I: 255–271.
- 57 Raymond Swing, "The Catholic View of Reconstruction," *Nation* 108 (Mar. 29, 1919), 467–468.
- 58 Jonathan Steinberg, "The Poor in Christ: Peasants, Priests and Politics in the Cosenza General Strike, November 1920," in *History, Society and the Churches: Essays in Honour of Owen Chadwick*, eds. Derek Beales and Geoffrey Best (Cambridge 1985), 257–278.
- 59 Fr. Marcel Dischl, C.M.M., *Transkei for Christ: A History of the Catholic Church in the Transkeian Territories* (n.p. 1982), 173–179.
- 60 Christopher Hamlin and John T. McGreevy, "The Greening of America, Catholic Style, 1930–1950," *Environmental History* 11 (July 2006): 464–500.
- 61 Leo R. Ward, C.S.C., *United For Freedom: Co-operatives and Christian Democracy* (Milwaukee 1945).
- 62 Catherine LeGrand, "The Antigonish Movement of Canada and Latin America: Catholic Cooperatives, Christian Communities, and Transnational Development in the Great Depression and the Cold War," in *Local Church, Global Church: Catholic Activism in Latin America from Rerum Novarum to Vatican II*, eds. Stephen J. C. Andes and Julia Young (Washington 2016), 237–244; Richard Timm, *Father of the Credit Unions in Bangladesh: Life of Father Charles J. Young, CSC* (Dhaka 2010), 91.
- 63 Oswald von Nell-Breuning, S.J., "The Drafting of Quadragesimo Anno," in *Readings in Moral Theology No. 5: Official Catholic Social Teaching*, eds. Charles Curran and Richard A. McCormick (New York 1986), 60–68; Noah Benezra Strote, *Lions and Lambs: Conflict in Weimar and the Creation of Post-Nazi Germany* (New Haven 2017) 61–63.
- 64 James Chappel, "The Thomist Debate over Inequality and Property Rights in Depression Era Europe," in *So What's New about Scholasticism? How Neo-Thomism Helped Shape the Twentieth Century*, eds. Rajesh Heynickx and Stéphane Symons (Berlin 2019), 21–38.
- 65 Nell-Breuning, "The Drafting of Quadragesimo Anno," 64.
- 66 Leszek Kuk, "A Powerful Catholic Church, Unstable State and Authoritarian Political Regime: The Christian Democratic Party in Poland," in *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918–1945: Volume I*, eds. Wolfram Kaiser and Helmut Wohnout (New York 2004), 157.
- 67 Keith, *Catholic Vietnam*, 196–197.
- 68 *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Volume One: The Genesis of the New Deal 1928–1932*, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman (New York 1938), 778.
- 69 Joseph Thorning, S.J., "Principles and Practice of the NRA," *Catholic Mind* 32 (Oct. 8, 1934), 363.

- 70 Luise Jörissen, "Als Oberlehrerin in Köln," in *Ernte eines Lebens: Helene Weber (1881–1962)*, eds. Anne Mohr and Elizabeth Prégardier (Essen 1991), 13–15.
- 71 Antonia Schilling, "Helene Weber (1881–1962)—Ein Weimarer Zentrumspolitiker," in *Die Frauen und der politische Katholizismus: Akteurinnen, Themen, Strategien*, eds. Markus Raasch and Andreas Linsenmann (Paderborn 2018), 268–269.
- 72 *Irish Constitution* (1937), Articles 41 and 43.
- 73 Susan Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914–1945* (Cambridge MA 1993), 394.
- 74 Helene Dawes, "The Catholic Church and the Woman Question: Catholic Feminism in Italy in the Early 1900s," *Catholic Historical Review* 97 (2011): 499.
- 75 John A. Ryan, *A Living Wage: Its Ethical and Economic Aspects* (New York 1906), 133; Ericka Kim Verba, *Catholic Feminism and the Social Question in Chile, 1910–1917: The Liga de Damas Chilenas* (Lewiston 2003), 129.
- 76 Kathleen Sprows Cummings, *New Women of the Old Faith: Gender and American Catholicism in the Progressive Era* (Chapel Hill 2009), 3.
- 77 Nicholas M. Creary, *Domesticating a Religious Import: The Jesuits and the Inculturation of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe, 1879–1980* (New York 2011), 49.
- 78 C. F. G. de Groot, *Brazilian Catholicism and the Ultramontane Reform, 1850–1930* (Amsterdam 1996), 121–123.
- 79 Dawes, "The Catholic Church and the Women's Question," 509.
- 80 Dawes, "The Catholic Church and the Women's Question," 516.
- 81 Douglas J. Cremer, "The Limits of Maternalism: Gender Ideology and the South German Catholic Workingwomen's Associations, 1904–1918," *Catholic Historical Review* 87 (2001): 450.
- 82 Schilling, "Helene Weber," 277.
- 83 Steven C. Hause with Anne R. Kenney, *Women's Suffrage and Social Politics in the French Third Republic* (Princeton 1984), 238, 255.
- 84 Christine Ehrick, *The Shield of the Weak: Feminism and the State in Uruguay 1903–1933* (Albuquerque 2005), 175–176; Adam Przeworski, "Conquered or Granted?: A History of Suffrage Extensions," *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (2009): 315–319.
- 85 Nord, "Catholic Culture in Interwar France," 1–20.
- 86 Ivereigh, *Catholicism and Politics in Argentina*, 98.
- 87 Emmanuel Mounier, "Manifeste au Service Du Personnalisme" [1936], in Mounier, *Oeuvres (1931–1939)* (Paris 1961), 1: 560; Laura S. Gellott, *The Catholic Church and the Authoritarian Regime in Austria, 1933–1938* (New York 1987), 331.
- 88 Laurie Marhoefer, *Sex and the Weimar Republic: German Homosexual Emancipation and the Rise of the Nazis* (Toronto 2015), 108.
- 89 Kevin Rickett, "Protectionism and Catholic Film Policy in Twentieth Century Ireland," in *Moralizing Cinema: Film, Catholicism and Power*, eds. Daniel Biltereyst and Daniela Treveri Gennari (New York 2015), 192.
- 90 Indre Cuplinskas, "National and Rational Dress: Catholics Debate Female Fashion in Lithuania, 1920s–1930s," *Church History* 88 (2019): 696–719; Ines Weber, "Kann denn Mode Katholisch sein? Katholischer Mediendiskurs und die Medienkommission des KDFB," in *Katholiken und Moderne: Katholische Frauenbewegung zwischen Tradition und Emanzipation*, ed. Gisela Muschiol (Münster 2003), 143–162; Maryann Valiulis, "Neither Feminist nor Flapper," in *Chattel, Servant or Citizen: Women's Status in Church, State and Society*, eds. Mary O'Dowd and Sabine Wichert (Belfast 1995), 168–178; Sally Dwyer-McNulty,

"Hems to Hairdos: Cultural Discourse and Philadelphia Catholic High Schools in the 1920s, a Case Study," *Journal of American Studies* 37 (2003): 179–200.

91 Schilling, "Helene Weber," 286.

92 Guido Convents, "Resisting the Lure of the Modern World: Catholics, International Politics and the Establishment of the International Catholic Office for Cinema (1918–1928)," in *Moralizing Cinema*, 19–32.

93 Daniel Biltereyst, " 'I Think Catholics Didn't Go to the Cinema': Catholic Film Exhibition Strategies and Cinema-Going Experiences in Belgium, 1930s–1960s," in *Moralizing Cinema*, 259.

94 McGreevy, *Catholicism and American Freedom*, 156–157.

95 Francisco Peredo Castro, "Catholicism and Mexican Cinema: A Secular State, A Deeply Conservative Society and a Powerful Hierarchy," in *Moralizing Cinema*, 72–73.

96 Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943–1988* (London 2003), 169.

97 Atina Grossmann, *Reforming Sex: The German Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform, 1920–1950* (New York 1995), 50–51; Neil Riddell, "The Catholic Church and the Labour Party," *Twentieth Century British History* 8 (1997): 179–182; McGreevy, *Catholicism and American Freedom*, 160.

98 Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge 2008), 73.

99 Lucia Pozzi, "The Problem of Birth Control in the United States under the Papacy of Pius XI," in *Pius XI and America*, eds. Charles R. Gallagher, David I. Kertzer, and Alberto Melloni (Berlin 2010), 209–232; Eugenio Pacelli report of Nov. 18, 1929, in *Die Lage der Kirche in Deutschland: Der Schlußbericht des Nuntius vom 18. November 1929* (Paderborn 2006), 125.

100 McGreevy, *Catholicism and American Freedom*, 163.

101 Guillaume Cuchet, "Quelques Données Concernant L'Encyclique *Casti Connubii*," in *Pie XI et La France*, ed. Jacques Prévotat (Rome 2010), 347–348.

102 McGreevy, *Catholicism and American Freedom*, 232.

103 McGreevy, *Catholicism and American Freedom*, 223.

104 Charlotte Wildman, "Irish-Catholic Women and Modernity in 1930s Liverpool," in *Women and Irish Diaspora Identities: Theories, Concepts and New Perspectives*, eds. D. A. J. MacPherson and Mary J. Hickman (Manchester 2014), 73.

105 Christopher Van Der Krogt, "Exercising the Utmost Vigilance: The Catholic Campaign against Contraception in New Zealand during the 1930s," *Journal of Religious History* 22 (1998): 325.

106 John Connelly, *From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the Jews 1933–1965* (Cambridge MA 2012), 15.

107 Francesco Cassata, *Building the New Man: Eugenics, Racial Science and Genetics in Twentieth-Century Italy* (New York 2011), 145.

108 Sharon Leon, " 'Hopelessly Entangled in Nordic Presuppositions': Catholic Participation in the American Eugenics Society in the 1920s," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 59 (2004): 41–49.

109 McGreevy, *Catholicism and American Freedom*, 224–225.

110 Michael Hollerich, "Catholic Anti-Liberalism in Weimar: Political Theology and Its Critics," in *The Weimar Moment: Liberalism, Political Theology and Law*, eds. Rudy Koshar and Len Kaplan (Lexington 2012), 37.

111 *Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio* (1922), §12.

112 Wilhelm Ribhegge, "Joseph Mausbach (1860–1931) and His Role in the Public Life of the Empire and the Weimar Republic," trans. Ralph Keen, *The Catholic Historical Review* 84 (1998): 37.

113 Derek Hastings, "How 'Catholic' Was the Early Nazi Movement? Religion, Race, and Culture in Munich, 1919–1924," *Central European History* 36 (2003): 383–433; Brendan Simms, *Hitler: A Global Biography* (New York 2021), 102–103.

114 Ventresca, *Soldier of Christ*, 62.

115 Yves Simon, *The Road to Vichy, 1918–1938*, trans. James A. Corbett and George J. McMorrow (Lanham, MD, 1988), 42.

116 Maurice Demers, *Connected Struggles: Catholics, Nationalists and Transnational Relations between Mexico and Quebec, 1917–1945* (Montreal 2014), 79.

117 Olivier Compagnon, “Le Maurrassisme en Amérique Latine: Etude comparée de cas argentin et brésilien,” in *Charles Maurras et L’Étranger L’Étranger et Charles Maurras*, eds. Olivier Dard and Michel Grunewald (Bern 2009), 289.

118 Philippe J. Roy, “La Préhistoire Du Coetus Internationalis Patrum: Une Formation Romaine, Antilibérale et Contre-révolutionnaire,” in *La Théologie Catholique Entre Intransigeance et Renouveau*, eds. Gilles Routhier, Phillippe J. Roy, and Karim Schelkens (Louvain 2011), 333.

119 Eugen Joseph Weber, *Action Française* (Stanford 1962), 232.

120 Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York 1931), 212–231.

121 Henri de Lubac, “Patriotisme et Nationalisme” [1933], in de Lubac, *Résistance chrétienne au Nazisme*, eds. Renée Bédarida and Jacques Prévotat (Paris 2006), 14.

122 John Dewey, “Church and State in Mexico” (1926), in Dewey, *The Later Works, 1925–1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale 1984), 2: 197–198.

123 Matthew Butler, *Popular Piety and Political Identity in Mexico’s Cristero Rebellion: Michoacán, 1927–1929* (Oxford 2004), 87.

124 Julia G. Young, “The Calles Government and Catholic Dissidents: Mexico’s Transnational Projects of Repression, 1926–1929,” *The Americas* 70 (2013): 75, 83–84.

125 Julia G. Young, “Cristero Diaspora: Mexican Immigrants, the U.S. Catholic Church, and Mexico’s Cristero War, 1926–1929,” *Catholic Historical Review* 98 (2012): 279.

126 Demers, *Connected Struggles*, 64–72.

127 Porter-Szücs, *Faith and Fatherland*, 337.

128 Stephen J. C. Andes, *The Vatican and Catholic Activism in Mexico and Chile: The Politics of Transnational Catholicism, 1920–1940* (New York 2014), 83–84.

129 An Vandenberghe, “Beyond Pierre Charles: The Emergence of Belgian Missiology Refined,” in *Mission & Science: Missiology Revised/Missologie Revisitée, 1850–1940*, eds. Carine Dujardin and Claude Prudhomme (Leuven 2015), 163.

130 Klaus Schatz, “The Yasukuni Shrine Affair: Paolo Marella and the Revision of the Prohibition of Eastern Rites,” *Archivum Historiae Societas Iesu* 81 (2012): 459.

131 Wu, *From Christ to Confucius*, 161–189.

132 Olivier Sibire, *Le Saint-Siège et L’Extrême-Orient (Chine, Corée, Japon) De Léon XIII À Pie XII (1880–1952)*, (Rome, 2012), 579.

133 Vincent Lebbe to Dom Bède, Sept. 20, 1939, in *Lettres du Père Lebbe*, 306–307.

134 Sibire, *Le Saint-Siège et L’Extrême-Orient*, 625; Harrison, *The Missionary’s Curse*, 143.

135 Lebbe to Dom Bède, Sept. 20, 1939, in *Lettres du Père Lebbe*, 307.